Working Papers
Words and Deeds: From Incompatibilities to Outcomes in Anti-Government Disputes
With Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Belén González, Dragana Vidovic, and Peter B. White
Abstract: Although dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, violent and non-violent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. Recent comparative literature addressing the decision to use violent or non-violent tactics suffers from a number of important limitations. Some studies only include secessionist disputes, excluding conflict over government, which is more often the focus of non-violent campaigns. Others examine only large-scale mobilization, and ignore the earlier stage of organizational articulation of grievances. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims and whether we eventually see mobilization resulting in civil wars or non-violent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and non-violent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 71 states from 1960-2012.
With Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Belén González, Dragana Vidovic, and Peter B. White
Abstract: Although dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, violent and non-violent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. Recent comparative literature addressing the decision to use violent or non-violent tactics suffers from a number of important limitations. Some studies only include secessionist disputes, excluding conflict over government, which is more often the focus of non-violent campaigns. Others examine only large-scale mobilization, and ignore the earlier stage of organizational articulation of grievances. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims and whether we eventually see mobilization resulting in civil wars or non-violent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and non-violent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 71 states from 1960-2012.
Does the United Nations Try to Prevent Civil Wars?
With Peter B. White and Kyle Beardsley
Abstract: Since at least the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been active in promoting the termination of civil wars. A large literature has examined the effects of these efforts. Yet, international actors, including the UN, do not wait until fighting starts to get involved in disputes between states and segments of their society. We examine the determinants of UN involvement in intrastate disputes by focusing on Security Council resolutions in self-determination disputes. We examine whether, outside of ongoing violence, the potential for regional contagion of violent conflict and a dispute's potential to escalate to violence affect the likelihood and type of UNSC resolutions. We find that the risk of contagion from neighboring violent conflicts as well as a past history of violent conflict increases UNSC involvement in disputes. This analysis shows that the UN acts proactively to prevent violence, rather than just reactively responding to existing violence.
With Peter B. White and Kyle Beardsley
Abstract: Since at least the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been active in promoting the termination of civil wars. A large literature has examined the effects of these efforts. Yet, international actors, including the UN, do not wait until fighting starts to get involved in disputes between states and segments of their society. We examine the determinants of UN involvement in intrastate disputes by focusing on Security Council resolutions in self-determination disputes. We examine whether, outside of ongoing violence, the potential for regional contagion of violent conflict and a dispute's potential to escalate to violence affect the likelihood and type of UNSC resolutions. We find that the risk of contagion from neighboring violent conflicts as well as a past history of violent conflict increases UNSC involvement in disputes. This analysis shows that the UN acts proactively to prevent violence, rather than just reactively responding to existing violence.
Explaining Civil War Severity: A formal model and empirical analysis
With Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates
Abstract: Civil wars show huge variation in their severity. We develop a formal model that examines how the number of rebel groups and the resources available to governments and rebels influence these actors' decisions to allocate resources to fighting or productive activity. The model shows that fighting is more severe in conflicts with multiple rebel groups where the government and rebel groups have more total resources compared to other conflicts. The model generates specific point predictions about the severity of civil war, and we calculate these predictions by inserting measures of the number of rebel groups and resources directly into the equilibrium equations. We compare these theoretical predictions to battle-related deaths in a series of statistical tests and find that the equilibrium-derived variable is a robust predictor of battle-related deaths. The formal model and empirical analysis provide insight into why some civil wars are so much more severe than others.
With Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates
Abstract: Civil wars show huge variation in their severity. We develop a formal model that examines how the number of rebel groups and the resources available to governments and rebels influence these actors' decisions to allocate resources to fighting or productive activity. The model shows that fighting is more severe in conflicts with multiple rebel groups where the government and rebel groups have more total resources compared to other conflicts. The model generates specific point predictions about the severity of civil war, and we calculate these predictions by inserting measures of the number of rebel groups and resources directly into the equilibrium equations. We compare these theoretical predictions to battle-related deaths in a series of statistical tests and find that the equilibrium-derived variable is a robust predictor of battle-related deaths. The formal model and empirical analysis provide insight into why some civil wars are so much more severe than others.
Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and the Severity of Civil War
With Kyle Beardsley and Peter B. White
Abstract: A large body of literature has demonstrated that third-party actions such as peacekeeping and mediation can promote the resolution of conflicts. Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, however, and we examine whether actions such as peacekeeping, mediation, and other action by the UN Security Council lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. We find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. We also find that other third-party activity, especially mediation, can play important roles in reducing bloodshed. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battle-field fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers. These analyses show that third parties, such as the UN, can rely on a range of tools to reduce violence and suffering in intrastate conflicts and that the success of third-party interventions cannot be judged solely on the basis of their capacity to fully end conflicts.
With Kyle Beardsley and Peter B. White
Abstract: A large body of literature has demonstrated that third-party actions such as peacekeeping and mediation can promote the resolution of conflicts. Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, however, and we examine whether actions such as peacekeeping, mediation, and other action by the UN Security Council lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. We find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. We also find that other third-party activity, especially mediation, can play important roles in reducing bloodshed. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battle-field fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers. These analyses show that third parties, such as the UN, can rely on a range of tools to reduce violence and suffering in intrastate conflicts and that the success of third-party interventions cannot be judged solely on the basis of their capacity to fully end conflicts.
