Working Papers
International Influences on Nonviolent and Violent Contention
With Jori Breslawski
Abstract: How do international actors influence dissidents’ decisions whether to challenge their states using violent means, nonviolence, both or neither? We argue that international influences can have important effects on the motivation dissidents have to challenge their governments as well as the political opportunity structure for violent and nonviolent contention. We examine the effect of two prominent types of actors—powerful democratic states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs) on dissident behavior in all national level elections in Africa from 2000-2012. Using integrated data drawn from four leading conflict events datasets, we find that dissidents are less likely to engage in violent contention when their government receives higher levels of military aid from the United States and in former French colonies, and more likely to engage in both violent and nonviolent contention when their state is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs.
With Jori Breslawski
Abstract: How do international actors influence dissidents’ decisions whether to challenge their states using violent means, nonviolence, both or neither? We argue that international influences can have important effects on the motivation dissidents have to challenge their governments as well as the political opportunity structure for violent and nonviolent contention. We examine the effect of two prominent types of actors—powerful democratic states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs) on dissident behavior in all national level elections in Africa from 2000-2012. Using integrated data drawn from four leading conflict events datasets, we find that dissidents are less likely to engage in violent contention when their government receives higher levels of military aid from the United States and in former French colonies, and more likely to engage in both violent and nonviolent contention when their state is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs.
Explaining Civil War Severity: A formal model and empirical analysis
With Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates
Abstract: What explains variation in civil-war severity? We argue that governments and rebel groups make strategic decisions regarding how much effort to devote to fighting based on their relative and absolute capabilities and the number of groups fighting. We develop a formal model that examines how the number of rebel groups and the resources available to governments and rebels influence conflict severity. The effect of the three parameters is highly interactive. In general, fighting is more severe in conflicts with multiple rebels groups where both sides have more resources compared to other conflicts. The model generates specific predictions about the severity of civil war that we calculate empirically by inserting the number of rebel groups and each side's troop levels directly into the equilibrium equations. We compare these theoretical predictions to actual battle-related deaths in statistical tests and find that the equilibrium-derived variable is a robust predictor of civil war severity.
With Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates
Abstract: What explains variation in civil-war severity? We argue that governments and rebel groups make strategic decisions regarding how much effort to devote to fighting based on their relative and absolute capabilities and the number of groups fighting. We develop a formal model that examines how the number of rebel groups and the resources available to governments and rebels influence conflict severity. The effect of the three parameters is highly interactive. In general, fighting is more severe in conflicts with multiple rebels groups where both sides have more resources compared to other conflicts. The model generates specific predictions about the severity of civil war that we calculate empirically by inserting the number of rebel groups and each side's troop levels directly into the equilibrium equations. We compare these theoretical predictions to actual battle-related deaths in statistical tests and find that the equilibrium-derived variable is a robust predictor of civil war severity.
Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and the Severity of Civil War
With Kyle Beardsley and Peter B. White
Abstract: Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, and we argue that actions such as mediation and peacekeeping can lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. Mediation can contribute to reductions in battlefield violence by reducing uncertainty, assisting the implementation of partial settlements, and by incentivizing reductions in hostilities. Peacekeepers can help attenuate violence by being interpositioned between combatants and, in the case of more robust mandates, by working actively to prevent violence. We examine these expectations using monthly data on battle-related deaths in African intra-state conflicts, and find that mediation and other diplomatic efforts have a large effect in reducing bloodshed. We also find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battlefield fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers.
With Kyle Beardsley and Peter B. White
Abstract: Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, and we argue that actions such as mediation and peacekeeping can lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. Mediation can contribute to reductions in battlefield violence by reducing uncertainty, assisting the implementation of partial settlements, and by incentivizing reductions in hostilities. Peacekeepers can help attenuate violence by being interpositioned between combatants and, in the case of more robust mandates, by working actively to prevent violence. We examine these expectations using monthly data on battle-related deaths in African intra-state conflicts, and find that mediation and other diplomatic efforts have a large effect in reducing bloodshed. We also find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battlefield fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers.