Working Papers
Where, when, and how does the UN work to prevent civil war in self-determination disputes?
With Peter B. White and Kyle Beardsley
Abstract: The UN has placed rhetorical emphasis on the prevention of armed conflict before it starts, but have the UN’s actions followed suit? We examine the determinants of UN involvement in intrastate conflict by focusing on UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in self-determination disputes. We consider three types of variables which potentially anticipate the onset of violent conflict — the potential for regional contagion, the history of violence, and other dispute-level characteristics — and whether they affect the likelihood and type of UNSC preventive action. We find strong evidence that the risk of contagion from nearby violent conflicts and a history of armed conflict increases the propensity for UNSC involvement. The analysis shows that, while political barriers likely restrict the ability for the UNSC to act when dispute-level characteristics suggest armed conflict is more likely, the UN does act proactively to prevent violence, rather than just reactively responding to existing violence.
With Peter B. White and Kyle Beardsley
Abstract: The UN has placed rhetorical emphasis on the prevention of armed conflict before it starts, but have the UN’s actions followed suit? We examine the determinants of UN involvement in intrastate conflict by focusing on UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in self-determination disputes. We consider three types of variables which potentially anticipate the onset of violent conflict — the potential for regional contagion, the history of violence, and other dispute-level characteristics — and whether they affect the likelihood and type of UNSC preventive action. We find strong evidence that the risk of contagion from nearby violent conflicts and a history of armed conflict increases the propensity for UNSC involvement. The analysis shows that, while political barriers likely restrict the ability for the UNSC to act when dispute-level characteristics suggest armed conflict is more likely, the UN does act proactively to prevent violence, rather than just reactively responding to existing violence.
Explaining Civil War Severity: A formal model and empirical analysis
With Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates
Abstract: What explains variation in civil-war severity? We argue that governments and rebel groups make strategic decisions regarding how much effort to devote to fighting based on their relative and absolute capabilities and the number of groups fighting. We develop a formal model that examines how the number of rebel groups and the resources available to governments and rebels influence conflict severity. The effect of the three parameters is highly interactive. In general, fighting is more severe in conflicts with multiple rebels groups where both sides have more resources compared to other conflicts. The model generates specific predictions about the severity of civil war that we calculate empirically by inserting the number of rebel groups and each side's troop levels directly into the equilibrium equations. We compare these theoretical predictions to actual battle-related deaths in statistical tests and find that the equilibrium-derived variable is a robust predictor of civil war severity.
With Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates
Abstract: What explains variation in civil-war severity? We argue that governments and rebel groups make strategic decisions regarding how much effort to devote to fighting based on their relative and absolute capabilities and the number of groups fighting. We develop a formal model that examines how the number of rebel groups and the resources available to governments and rebels influence conflict severity. The effect of the three parameters is highly interactive. In general, fighting is more severe in conflicts with multiple rebels groups where both sides have more resources compared to other conflicts. The model generates specific predictions about the severity of civil war that we calculate empirically by inserting the number of rebel groups and each side's troop levels directly into the equilibrium equations. We compare these theoretical predictions to actual battle-related deaths in statistical tests and find that the equilibrium-derived variable is a robust predictor of civil war severity.
Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and the Severity of Civil War
With Kyle Beardsley and Peter B. White
Abstract: Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, and we argue that actions such as mediation and peacekeeping can lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. Mediation can contribute to reductions in battlefield violence by reducing uncertainty, assisting the implementation of partial settlements, and by incentivizing reductions in hostilities. Peacekeepers can help attenuate violence by being interpositioned between combatants and, in the case of more robust mandates, by working actively to prevent violence. We examine these expectations using monthly data on battle-related deaths in African intra-state conflicts, and find that mediation and other diplomatic efforts have a large effect in reducing bloodshed. We also find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battlefield fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers.
With Kyle Beardsley and Peter B. White
Abstract: Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, and we argue that actions such as mediation and peacekeeping can lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. Mediation can contribute to reductions in battlefield violence by reducing uncertainty, assisting the implementation of partial settlements, and by incentivizing reductions in hostilities. Peacekeepers can help attenuate violence by being interpositioned between combatants and, in the case of more robust mandates, by working actively to prevent violence. We examine these expectations using monthly data on battle-related deaths in African intra-state conflicts, and find that mediation and other diplomatic efforts have a large effect in reducing bloodshed. We also find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battlefield fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers.
