Where do mediators try to prevent civil war?

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Abstract

Mediation has emerged as a crucial instrument employed by external actors to resolve conflicts and mitigate violence. While existing research has extensively examined mediation within civil wars, the use of mediation to prevent conflicts before they escalate remains understudied. We address this gap in the literature by investigating the determinants of mediation efforts in the context of conflict prevention, specifically within self-determination disputes. Focusing on a sample of 57 self-determination disputes spanning from 1991 to 2015, this article introduces the first comprehensive cross-national data set on mediation events in such disputes, irrespective of war. Drawing on the mediation literature, we argue that dynamics at multiple levels, group, state, regional, and global, shape the likelihood that mediation is employed in a selfdetermination dispute. Our quantitative analysis shows that rebel groups engaged in civil war, previous mediation efforts and violent tactics increase the likelihood of mediation, while state-level factors such as regime type produce a mixed effect necessitating further study. Overall, this article enhances our understanding of the intricate dynamics that guide external actors' mediation strategies, shedding light on the patterns of mediation in the realm of conflict prevention.

Introduction

Mediation is a tool outside actors frequently use to resolve conflicts and reduce violence. High-profile peace agreements such as the Good Friday Accords in the Northern Ireland conflict, the Oslo Accords in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the southern Sudanese conflict were all facilitated by international mediators. A range of organizations send mediators to intrastate disputes, including the United Nations (UN), regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD), and non-governmental organizations such as Swiss Peace and the Community of Sant'Egidio.

Many of the most high-profile mediation efforts, including those in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, and southern Sudan, occur in the context of intrastate violent conflict. A huge academic literature examines mediation in civil war, with analyses both of which civil wars see mediation and what the effect of this mediation is.¹ However, organizations such as the UN, AU, IGAD, Swiss Peace, etc. all express a commitment to preventing violent conflicts before they break out, and preventive diplomacy is frequently lauded as a conflict prevention tool.

We know much less about the determinants of where mediation is used for conflict prevention and the effect that its use has. In this article, we seek to fill this gap. We have collected systematic data on the occurrence of mediation in a random sample of 57

^{1.} This literature is facilitated by data sets that provide information about mediation in intrastate armed conflicts, such as the Civil War Mediation data set (CWM) (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011), the Managing Low-Intensity Conflict (MILC) data set (Melander, Möller, and Öberg 2009), the Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) data set (Croicu et al. 2013), the African Peace Processes (APP) data set (Duursma and Gamez 2022), and the Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts (PNCC) data set (Ari 2023).

self-determination disputes from 1991-2015. These data are, to our knowledge, the first quantitative, cross-national data on mediation outside of the context of intrastate violence. We use these data to examine which self-determination disputes see mediation, when these mediation efforts occur, and which dispute-years see higher levels of mediation than others.

Self-determination disputes are a useful arena to examine mediation as a tool of conflict prevention. Because these disputes involve organizations making public claims for greater autonomy (which can include, but does not have to, calls for secession), they are identifiable both by potential mediators and by us as researchers. Self-determination disputes also frequently become violent, in fact, they are one of the main causes of civil war. However, there is variation across these disputes in whether or not civil war occurs, and variation within disputes in the timing of violence. This variation allows us to examine mediation in a set of disputes that never experience civil war, have intermittent periods of violence, and which have full-scale civil war.

Consistent with the literature on the selection of mediation, we argue that mediation is more likely in the cases where both potential mediators and disputants perceive the greatest need for help, and where they also see the potential for successfully resolving the dispute. One clear implication of this is that self-determination disputes in civil war are more likely to see civil war, which we find. However, in nonviolent self-determination disputes the factors driving the perception of both need and potential success are quite different than in civil wars. We argue that they are affected by dynamics at the SD group, state, regional, and global level. We conduct a statistical analysis examining the impact of dynamics at each of these levels. We find that group-level factors are particularly influential, and that SD disputes where organizations representing the SD group are using violence and with a history of prior mediation are more likely to experience mediation.

The argument and analysis in this article make important contributions to our understanding of mediation and conflict prevention. We describe these contributions, and lay out an agenda for further research, in the conclusion.

Existing explanations of mediation selection

While many civil wars have peace talks in the presence of a mediator, many do not. Mediation is not randomly assigned, and the factors that influence where mediators go almost certainly also impact whether or not peace talks lead to stable agreements. Scholars interested in understanding whether mediation has a positive effect in conflict resolution, then, have to examine which conflicts get mediation. There are many studies that examine the selection of mediation.

Mediation is by definition voluntary, mediators do not have to agree to mediate disputes, and the disputants do not have to participate in mediated talks or abide by agreements reached. As such, understanding the selection of mediation involves both understanding when offers of mediation are made, and when they are accepted by the disputants.

Scholars have argued that potential mediators are more likely to offer mediation when they have some stake in the conflict and when they anticipate that there is a chance of success for the process (Clayton and Gleditsch 2014). Disputants, meanwhile, are more likely to accept offers of mediation when they see the conflict as costly to them. Governments, in particular, are often hesitant to negotiate with rebel groups, and so have to see a clear threat from them to negotiate (Svensson 2007; Greig and Regan 2008). While these studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of where mediation occurs, they are limited to the context of civil war. In the next section, we build an argument for where mediators go beyond the context of civil war, drawing on a similar logic to that here.

Mediation in self-determination disputes

Our theoretical framework builds on the existing literature on mediation selection, and argues that mediation in self-determination disputes is more likely when (1) mediators see both a need for and potential for success of mediation, and (2) governments and organizations representing self-determination disputes see these disputes as costly and unlikely to be resolved without outside assistance. One clear situation in which these dynamics are more likely to be present is when self-determination disputes are in civil war. Civil wars are visible to outsiders, including potential mediators, and are costly for both states and self-determination groups (Fearon 1995; Cunningham 2013). This leads to our first empirical expectation:

H1: When states and organizations representing SD groups are in civil war, mediation will be more likely.

Civil war is not the only dynamic that can lead to both a perceived need for mediation and potential success. There are a number of dynamics at the self-determination group, state, regional, and geopolitical level that can do so as well. We explore them here.

Group-level factors

While many self-determination disputes are not in civil war, there are those that have periods of violence. These periods often occur during periods of dormancy between active civil wars, but may also occur in disputes without an active civil war. In the Catalan dispute in Spain, for example, the group held a referendum in 2017 on independence for Catalonia against the wishes of the Spanish government. There was significant violence as the Spanish police forces attempted to prevent the election from going forward, and this violence received widespread international media attention. However, the violence did not reach the level of "internal armed conflict" in many data sets.

Given that many organizations that engage in mediation express a commitment to conflict prevention, we would expect mediation to be more likely in disputes that are violent, even if they are not in full-scale civil war. This leads to our next expectation:

H2: When organizations representing SD groups engage in violence, mediation will be more likely.

Another group-level dynamic that can affect the likelihood of mediation in selfdetermination disputes is the history of mediation in the same dispute. There is a level of path dependence to diplomatic efforts such as mediation, and when disputes have had previous mediation attempts, whether successful or not, they are more likely to attract mediation by the same organization. As such, we expect that disputes with a history of mediation will be more likely to experience mediation efforts.

H3: When self-determination disputes have a history of mediation, they are more likely to

experience mediation.

Finally, in some cases self-determination groups have received accommodation from the state. Accommodation of these groups is often an iterative process of groups receiving more control over the territory they inhabit, but not at the level fully desired by the group (Cunningham 2011). Accommodation by the state, however, sends a signal that there is the potential for additional accommodation, and so can suggest to mediators that there is a prospect for success in a mediated negotiation.

H $_4$: Self-determination disputes with a history of accommodation by the state will be more likely to experience mediation.

State-level factors

There are also a number of state-level factors that could influence whether governments in particular are willing to assent to mediation and whether mediators are willing to offer mediation. The first is regime type. Self-determination disputes occur across countries of all regime types and levels of economic development. In addition, even advanced democracies are often very opposed to allowing parts of their territory to secede, as seen in the dispute between Spain and Catalonia.

Democratic governments, however, are generally based on norms of political compromise, deliberative governance, and political debate. As such, there are greater costs for democratic governments for refusing to participate in political negotiations. In addition, these governments are more likely to grant accommodation (short of full independence) to self-determination groups, and so mediators are likely to see negotiations in democracies as having greater potential for success. This leads to our first state-level expectation:

H5: Self-determination disputes in more democratic governments will be more likely to experience mediation.

Another state-level dynamic that can influence the potential for mediation at the state-level is whether there are other conflicts in the country. Many countries with selfdetermination groups, such as India, Myanmar, and the Philippines, also experience other armed conflicts, either with other self-determination groups or over control of the government. The presence of another civil war in the country has at least three effects which could increase the likelihood of mediation. First, civil war in the country means that there are often already organizations engaged in conflict management, which increases the supply of potential mediators. Second, even actors not directly involved pay attention to countries in civil war, and so may notice the potential for conflict in self-determination disputes that are not currently in civil war. Third, conflicts do often diffuse, both within and across borders (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008), and governments are likely more open to assistance to help them prevent the spread of conflicts that are already occurring.

H6: Mediation is more likely in self-determination disputes in countries that are experiencing a civil war in another dispute or over government.

Finally, countries' alliance patterns are likely to matter as well. While the United Nations is by no means the only actor that provides mediation, it is a significant provider of mediation efforts and also often plays a role in authorizing and leading conflict management efforts. Governments that are permanent members of the security council or who have closeties to the permanent five may be hesitant to have outsiders interfere in their affairs, and have greater ability to block these efforts.

H7: Mediation is less likely in self-determination disputes in countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council or close allies of permanent members of the Security Council.

Regional and geopolitical factors

Beyond these group-level and state-level factors that can influence both the supply and demand for mediation, factors at the regional and international level can also have an impact. At the regional level, the presence of a civil war in the region can focus attention of international actors on the countries around that civil war country. Civil wars often diffuse from one country to neighboring countries, and so potential mediators interested in conflict prevention may engage proactively to try to prevent this. This type of activity could be seen in Macedonia as Yugoslavia was collapsing in the early 1990s. In addition, if states and organizations representing SD groups see the potential for conflict diffusion, they may be more likely to accept offers of mediation.

H8: Mediation is more likely in countries bordering a country that has a civil war.

Other geopolitical factors can affect the potential supply of mediators. Colonial ties can make mediators more likely to see a need to intervene, since former colonial powers often maintain close ties with their former colonies. In addition, these colonial ties can mean that the disputants see mediators as more credible in the dispute (Reid 2017), and thus colonial ties can increase the occurrence of mediation. H9: Mediation is more likely in countries that are former colonies.

New data on mediation in SD disputes

What factors affect when and where mediation occurs in self-determination disputes? Answering these questions requires data on dispute mediation both outside of and during conflict. Although there are data sets recording instances of mediation during civil wars, such as the CWM, MILC, MIC and APP data sets discussed in the introduction, to this point no data set exists that does record mediation events for SD disputes, both during and outside of civil conflict.

To address this gap, we created an original data set on mediation in SD disputes-the Mediation in Self-Determination Disputes data set (MSDD). These data are coded using a random sample from the total population of disputes identified by Cunningham (2013). Of the overall 146 SD disputes included in her data we retained 136 for our sample and are in the process of coding mediation events for them in random order for the time period of 1991 to 2015. We currently have data on 57 of these disputes, representing roughly 42% of the total number. Table 5 displays the full list of disputes in our sample and can be found in the appendix.

In the MSDD, we define a mediation event as a meeting between one or both parties to an SD dispute and a third party in which (1) the dispute is discussed and (2) the third party shows a clear intent to have the dispute resolved peacefully, either via proclamation or action. While the parties to the dispute are either the state government or a direct affiliate, or an organization that is part of the SD movement, third parties acting as mediators may be individuals, state governments, international or non-governmental organizations, or other political entities.

To identify mediation events, we coded English-language news articles after processing search results from NexisUni with a machine learning (ML) model trained on hand-coded news articles. The model assigns labels to individual news articles that reflect the probability of their containing meetings of disputants with third parties. Only news articles with a probability greater than 50% were retained for manual coding, drastically reducing the number of articles human coders have to go through while, on average, retaining a more than 80% overlap with events coded by hand only. After ML processing human coders went through news articles, entering events in the data set using part (1) of the aforementioned definition. In a second step events were coded as either mediation or not, using part (2) of the definition. To code mediation, coders looked for either explicit statements during or after meetings or actions like shuttle diplomacy as evidence for a third party's interest in peaceful conflict resolution.

With this methodology we have identified 1,317 mediation events for 53 disputes spanning 1,325 dispute-years.² This is a substantially higher number of mediation events than is found in any existing cross-national data set. This is true because the MSDD identify mediation events in disputes such as the Flemings in Belgium, Hungarians in Slovakia, Muslims in Sri Lanka, and indigenous groups in Mexico and Colombia that never experience armed conflict. In addition, the MSDD identify greater numbers of mediation events in years

^{2.} Four of the 57 disputes for which we have data were coded at the annual level and were only coded as receiving mediation if evidence of direct mediation was found. Therefore, these disputes are not included in logit models (1-3) in Table 3, which employ the unrestricted measure of mediation, and they are excluded entirely from the negative binomial models in Table 4. These disputes were Croatia - Serbs, South Africa - Zulus, Ukraine - Crimean Russians, and Pakistan - Baluchis.

during and after armed conflict than other data sets that also code these periods.

Figures 1 and 2 provide a direct comparison of our data with that in the MILC, MIC, CWM, and APP data sets. Each of these projects seek to code mediation efforts, but build their coding around armed conflicts in the UCDP-PRIO ACD. In Figure 1, we examine the number of mediation events identified in each year in each data set in the Senegal-Casamancia dispute. That dispute experienced an internal armed conflict from 1991-2003 and then again in 2011, and there are mediation events identified in all five data sets, including ours.

Figure 1 shows that our data identifies most of the mediation events found in the existing data, as well as others not found. In particular, we see that in 2013 the other four data sets identify no mediation events, while we find several events, including mediation by a Swiss NGO–Geneva Call–and the Government of Guinea Bissau surrounding de-mining efforts in the Casamance region, as well as direct talks in Rome, Italy to establish an agenda for upcoming peace talks, mediated by the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio.

Figure 2 compares the MSDD, MIC, MILC, and CWM for the Georgia-South Ossetia dispute. As the figure shows, the MSDD data identify dramatically more mediation events in this dispute than existing data projects. This includes events led by various state governments including both Russia and the US, throughout the temporal period. The difference is especially stark from 2008 to 2015 when the MSDD finds over 100 mediation events while the CWM, the only other data set collecting data in this temporal period, finds no events.

The importance of identifying the effect of mediation outside of civil war is further illustrated by Table 1, which provides a side-by-side comparison of dispute years with and without civil war in terms of whether they experienced any mediation effort. We find that a majority of years with mediation take place outside of the context of civil war, further





Figure 1: Senegal-Casamancia Dispute Mediation Data Set Comparison

Figure 2: Georgia-South Ossetia Dispute Mediation Data Set Comparison



underlining the need for data on mediation especially outside of civil conflict.

	Civil War				
Mediation	No	Yes	Row total		
No	742	108	850		
	87.3%	12.7%	77.6%		
Yes	144	101	245		
	58.8%	41.2%	22.4%		
Column total	886	209	1095		

Table 1: Cross-tabulation of Mediation and Civil War Incidence per Year

Empirical analysis

Our theoretical framework led to a series of hypotheses about how dispute, state, and regional/geopolitical factors affect the occurrence of mediation in self-determination disputes. In all of our statistical tests, the unit of analysis is the SD dispute-year. We use two dependent variables to measure mediation. The first is a binary indicator of whether or not mediation occurred in the dispute year. The second is a count of the number of mediation events that occurred in the dispute year. In the statistical models where mediation is measured as a binary, we use logistic regressions, and the count models are negative binomial regressions. We cluster standard errors on the dispute.

We include a series of independent variables to test our hypotheses. To test Hypothesis 1, we include a measure of whether there is an internal armed conflict in the SD dispute year. This variable is based on the UCDP-PRIO ACD (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Cunningham (2013) has tied these civil wars to SD disputes in her data, and we use this coding to identify civil wars in these disputes. This variable is coded as a 1 in every year where a conflict involving the SD dispute reaches at least 25 battle-related deaths. To test Hypothesis 2, we include a variable indicating the ratio of factions out of an SD movement that used violent tactics in a given dispute year. Data for this variable originate from the updated Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP) by Cunningham, Dahl and Frugé (2020). Because this ratio may indicate different levels of violence depending on the number of organizations active in the dispute, we also include a control for the number of factions (logged) active in the year.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that mediation will be more likely in disputes with a history of mediation. We test this prediction by including a one-year lag of the binary measure of mediation in the logit models, and a one-year lag of the count of mediation events in the negative binomial regressions.

To test Hypothesis 4, we include a binary indicator of previous concessions, taking on a 1 if a given SD movement has received either cultural or political concessions in the past. Cunningham (2013) finds that a history of concessions makes civil war in these disputes less likely, and argues that they could indicate that governments are interested in peaceful resolution of disputes. This interest could increase the likelihood of mediation as well. Data for this variable is obtained from the updated SRDP.

The next set of hypotheses are about state-level features. To test Hypothesis 5, we include a binary indicator of whether or not a country is democracy. That variable takes on a 1 if the PolityIV score of a given country is greater than 6. Hypothesis 6 predicts that disputes in countries that experience civil wars in disputes outside of the SD dispute will be more likely to see mediation. To test that, we include a variable drawn from the UCDP indicating whether the country is experiencing another internal armed conflict in the year.

Self-determination disputes take place in a variety of types of countries, including

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Mediation (binary)	1,325	0.189	0.392	0	1
Mediation frequency	$1,\!325$	0.994	3.374	0	32
Group civil war	$1,\!195$	0.205	0.404	0	1
Violent tactics (ratio)	1,224	0.125	0.234	0.000	1.000
Fatal violent tactics (ratio)	1,224	0.097	0.207	0.000	1.000
SD Factions (log)	1,224	0.982	0.727	0.000	2.708
Previous concessions	1,235	0.577	0.494	0	1
Democracy	$1,\!387$	0.426	0.495	0	1
Other civil war in state	$1,\!195$	0.362	0.481	0	1
P5 member	1,425	0.105	0.307	0	1
P5 ally	1,425	0.222	0.416	0	1
Neighboring conflict	1,425	0.557	0.497	0	1
Former UK colony	1,425	0.263	0.441	0	1
Former French colony	1,425	0.088	0.283	0	1

 Table 2: Summary Statistics

permanent members of the UNSC. Hypothesis 7 predicts that disputes in the P5, and in allies of the P5, will be less likely to see mediation. To test this hypothesis, we include two variables. The first is a dichotomous measure of whether the country is one of the five permanent members of the UNSC. The second is dichotomous measure of whether the country is in a mutual defense alliance with a P5 member. These variables were constructed using the Correlates of War Formal Alliances dataset (v4.1) (Gibler 2009).

The final two hypotheses examine the influence of regional/geopolitical factors. To test Hypothesis 8, we include a measure of whether any neighboring country is experiencing an internal armed conflict in the calendar year. To test Hypothesis 9, we measure whether the country was a former colony of either France or the United Kingdom. France and the UK have both kept closer ties with their former colonies than other European countries, and each frequently gets involved in these former colonies, including in efforts to resolve internal disputes. These colony dummy variables were constructed using the COW Colonial/Dependency Contiguity dataset. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the mediation and independent variables.

Table 3 reports the results of logistic regressions. The first three models employ an unrestricted measure of mediation, which registers as a '1' if any instance of third-party mediation (i.e., bilateral, indirect, direct) is observed and '0' otherwise. The second three models repeat the regressions with a restricted measure of mediation, which captures only instances of direct third-party mediation. Each set of models first controls for group-level effects (H2-H4), then state-level variables (H5-H7), and then regional and geopolitical factors (H8-H9). All of the independent variables, with the exception of time invariant variables (for the time frame of this dataset), are lagged to control for the possibility of reverse causality.

As anticipated in H1, civil war in the previous dispute-year is positively associated with the likelihood of mediation occurrence, regardless of the measure employed. This variable is statistically significant in all models, with the exception of those that only control for group-level effects. Concerning group-level effects, we find support for H2 and H3, with both the use of violent tactics and mediation in the prior dispute-year increasing the likelihood of mediation. The ratio of SD factions using violent tactics is statistically significant (p < .05) in models 3 through 6, while prior mediation is statistically significant (p < .001) in all six models. This supports the argument that mediation is a path-dependent process and that mediation selection is nonrandom. While the measure of previous concessions does achieve the expected sign of H4, it fails to reach statistical significance in any of the models.

	(1; Any)	(2; Any)	(3; Any)	(4; Direct)	(5; Direct)	(6; Direct)
Group civil war (lag)	0.621	0.686*	0.706*	0.662	0.806*	0.859**
	(0.322)	(0.311)	(0.296)	(0.366)	(0.336)	(0.321)
SD violent tactics (lag)	0.786	0.941	1.072^{*}	1.187^{*}	1.390^{*}	1.495**
	(0.512)	(0.487)	(0.496)	(0.541)	(0.550)	(0.554)
SD factions (log count, lag)	0.274	0.355	0.333	0.321	0.330	0.292
	(0.223)	(0.192)	(0.199)	(0.296)	(0.244)	(0.256)
Mediation (any, lag)	2.897***	2.855***	2.820***			
	(0.361)	(0.387)	(0.359)			
Previous concessions	0.325	0.332	0.241	0.527	0.602	0.483
	(0.262)	(0.260)	(0.266)	(0.321)	(0.307)	(0.316)
Democracy (lag)		-0.319	-0.289		-0.148	-0.058
		(0.342)	(0.316)		(0.370)	(0.374)
Other civil war in state (lag)		-0.310	-0.441		-0.512	-0.598
		(0.276)	(0.308)		(0.336)	(0.354)
P5 member		0.054	0.144		0.426	0.585
		(0.619)	(0.638)		(0.588)	(0.605)
P5 ally (lag)		0.459	0.617		0.355	0.548
		(0.414)	(0.352)		(0.443)	(0.423)
Neighboring conflict (lag)			0.293			0.376
			(0.323)			(0.403)
Former UK colony			0.313			0.325
			(0.387)			(0.391)
Former French colony			-0.502			-0.154
			(0.617)			(0.606)
Mediation (direct, lag)				3.280***	3.152***	3.117***
				(0.350)	(0.370)	(0.352)
Constant	-2.997^{***}	-2.984^{***}	-3.167^{***}	× -3.904***	-3.868***	-4.173^{***}
	(0.328)	(0.357)	(0.397)	(0.375)	(0.388)	(0.434)
Num.Obs.	1041	1005	1005	1137	1101	1101
R2	0.337	0.350	0.355	0.390	0.397	0.401
R2 Adj.	0.328	0.333	0.333	0.379	0.378	0.375

Table 3: Mediation Incidence in State-SD Movement Dyads, 1991–2015 Logit Models

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on KGCID.* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

None of the state-level or regional and geopolitical variables reach statistical significance in any of the models; however, this is not entirely surprising. Mediation can be time intensive and politically and materially costly. The state-level and regional factors that we include here may not be sufficient to motivate a potential mediator to become involved in a SD dispute that has not yet become violent or in which mediation investments have not yet been made.

Importantly, mediation is more common in SD disputes than binary measures at the annual level can capture. Because the MSDD data set includes information at the mediation event-level, we are able to test these hypotheses on an alternate measure of mediation: annual frequency.³ Table 4 presents the results of negative binomial regressions, first on the count of any mediation events, and second on the count of direct mediation events.

These results provide further evidence of that mediation efforts are directed toward disputes at greatest risk of escalation. While the civil war measure remains positive, it is only statistically significant in the final two models, whereas the use of violent tactics remains a consistent driver of mediation frequency across all models and both measures of mediation. A history of mediation also continues to exert a positive effect on the number of mediation efforts in a given dispute-year. Previous concessions still fails to reach statistical significance in any model, suggesting that mediation efforts are driven more by on-the-ground factors than by the dynamic political interactions within state-SD movement dyads.

State-level factors also appear to be important drivers of mediation frequency; however, they do not always achieve the relational direction proposed in the hypotheses. Democ-

^{3.} In a future iteration of this paper, we plan to test whether group-, state-, and regional/geopolitical factors also drive the occurrence and frequency of the different types of mediation (e.g., bilateral, indirect, direct) that SD disputes receive.

	(1; Any)	(2; Any)	(3; Any)	(4; Direct)	(5; Direct)	(6; Direct)
Group civil war (lag)	0.453	0.401	0.464	0.633	0.750*	0.892*
	(0.303)	(0.281)	(0.274)	(0.407)	(0.362)	(0.354)
SD violent tactics (lag)	1.307^{*}	1.682**	1.758***	1.343*	1.716^{**}	1.882**
	(0.521)	(0.524)	(0.495)	(0.569)	(0.584)	(0.579)
SD factions (log count, lag)	0.290	0.479	0.481	0.411	0.404	0.362
	(0.279)	(0.267)	(0.269)	(0.297)	(0.231)	(0.253)
Mediation frequency (any, lag)	0.325^{***}	0.335***	0.319^{***}			
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.021)			
Previous concessions	0.481	0.499	0.393	0.715	0.763	0.573
	(0.360)	(0.348)	(0.372)	(0.436)	(0.414)	(0.429)
Democracy (lag)		-0.816^{**}	-0.729^{*}		-0.179	0.045
		(0.301)	(0.297)		(0.541)	(0.492)
Other civil war in state (lag)		-0.469	-0.569^{*}		-0.711^{*}	-0.806^{*}
		(0.262)	(0.268)		(0.341)	(0.374)
P5 member		-0.175	-0.175		0.175	0.409
		(0.527)	(0.554)		(0.524)	(0.555)
P5 ally		0.602	0.604		0.284	0.621
		(0.315)	(0.338)		(0.641)	(0.562)
Neighboring conflict (lag)			0.179			0.685
			(0.279)			(0.460)
Former UK colony			0.048			0.285
			(0.410)			(0.533)
Former French colony			-0.680			-0.299
			(0.754)			(0.690)
Mediation frequency (direct, lag)				0.638^{***}	0.571^{***}	0.515^{***}
				(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.056)
(Intercept)	-2.063^{***}	-2.016^{***}	-2.031^{***}	-3.303^{***}	-3.135^{***}	-3.687^{***}
	(0.335)	(0.374)	(0.404)	(0.359)	(0.342)	(0.534)
Num.Obs.	1041	1005	1005	1041	1005	1005

Table 4: Mediation Frequency in State-SD Movement Dyads, 1991–2015 Negative Binomial Models

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on KGCID.* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

racy is statistically significant in models 2 and 3 and negative, suggesting that a democratic government decreases the rate of mediation attempts. The variable loses statistical significance in models 5 and 6. These mixed results should be interpreted with caution, and it would be worthwhile for future tests of the democracy hypothesis to probe this relationship further. The negative and significant relationship in models 2 and 3 may be indicative of a difference in mediation success rates across polity types.

The variable measuring whether there is another ongoing civil war in the state is statistically significant but in the opposite direction than predicted in H6. This finding is robust across both applications of the mediation variable and could suggest that states focus on one dispute at a time in their mediation efforts, or that the conditions created by multiple ongoing conflicts are unfavorable to external mediation efforts. Neither of the P5 nor the colony variables are statistically significant. All of the coefficients on the regional and geopolitical measures are small and statistically insignificant. Again, this could be reflecting the costs of mediation and potential mediators' willingness to become involved.

In sum, the results of these models suggest that, when examining whether mediation occurs at all, group-level factors - particularly, prior mediation and the use of violent tactics - provide greater explanatory power than do state- and regional/geopolitical factors. This is plausible given that mediation can be politically and materially costly, as well as time intensive. However, several of the variables proposed in the hypotheses are important to understand the variation in mediation frequency across self-determination disputes. In particular, we find that democracy and another ongoing civil war in the state decrease the number of mediation events observed in a given dispute year.

Conclusion

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Appendix

KGCID	Dispute	Date Range
101	Afghanistan - Tajiks	1991 - 2015
235	Afghanistan - Uzbeks	1991 - 2015
102	Algeria - Berbers	1991 - 2015
301	Angola - Cabindans	1991 - 2015
402	Belgium - Flemings	1991 - 2015
104	Belgium - Walloons	1991 - 2015
141	Bhutan - Lhotshampas	1991 - 2015
403	Cameroon - Westerners	1991 - 2015
404	Chad - Southerners	1991 - 2015
107	Colombia - Indigenous Peoples	1991 - 2015
306	Congo-Kinshasa - Bakongo	1991 - 2015
406	Congo-Kinshasa - Lunda and Yeke	1991 - 2015
307	Croatia - Serbs	1991 - 2015
108	Cyprus - Turkish Cypriots	1991 - 2015
308	Equatorial Guinea - Bubis	1991 - 2015
309	Ethiopia - Oromos	1991 - 2015
207	France - Bretons	1991 - 2015
310	Georgia - Adzhars	1991 - 2015
311	Georgia - South Ossetians	1991 - 2015
410	India - Assamese	1991 - 2015
210	India - Reang (Bru)	1991 - 2015
313	India - Tripuras	1991 - 2015
413	Indonesia - Acehnese	1991 - 2015
214	Laos - Hmong	1991 - 2015
118	Mexico - Indigenous Peoples (non-Mayan or Zapotecs)	1991 - 2015
119	Moldova - Gagauz	1991 - 2015
121	Myanmar - Kachins	1991 - 2015
120	Myanmar - Rohingyas	1991 - 2015
217	Myanmar - Shan	1991 - 2015

Table 5: Sample Disputes and Date Ranges

KGCID	Dispute	Date Range
122	Niger - Tuaregs	1991 - 2015
219	Nigeria - Ibos	1991 - 2015
422	Pakistan - Baluchis	1991 - 2015
139	Pakistan - Sarakis	1991 - 2015
424	Philippines - Moros	1991 - 2015
223	Russia - Buryat	1991 - 2015
326	Russia - Kumyks	1991 - 2015
224	Russia - Yakut	1991 - 2015
225	Senegal - Casamacias	1991 - 2015
327	Slovakia - Hungarians	1991 - 2015
427	Somalia - Puntland Darods	1991 - 2015
129	South Africa - Afrikaners	1991 - 2015
226	South Africa - Khoisan	1991 - 2015
329	South Africa - Zulus	1991 - 2015
130	Sri Lanka - Muslims	1991 - 2015
330	Sudan - Southerners	1991 - 2015
430	Switzerland - Jurassians	1991 - 2015
228	Tanzania - Zanzibaris	1991 - 2015
431	Thailand - Malay-Muslims	1991 - 2015
134	Ukraine - Crimean Russians	1991 - 2015
229	Ukraine - Crimean Tatars	1991 - 2015
230	United Kingdom - Catholics	1991 - 2015
333	United Kingdom - Cornish	1991 - 2015
335	Yugoslavia - Albanians	1991 - 2015
336	Yugoslavia - Montenegrins	1991 - 2015
436	Yugoslavia - Sandzak Muslims	1991 - 2015
138	Zambia - Lozi	1991 - 2015
234	Zimbabwe - Ndebele	1991 - 2015