Where do mediators try to prevent civil war?

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Abstract

Mediation is a crucial instrument employed by external actors to resolve armed conflicts and mitigate violence. A huge academic literature examines mediation in civil war, with analyses of both which civil wars see mediation and what the effect of this mediation is. Many organizations express a commitment to conflict prevention, and engage in mediation to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict. There is much less research on when mediation is used as a tool of conflict prevention. We have collected new data on all mediation efforts in a random sample of 57 self-determination disputes from 1991-2015, which includes disputes that never experience armed conflict, as well as years before and after armed conflicts in disputes that do. We develop a theoretical argument for the conditions under which mediators are likely to offer mediation, and governments and representatives of SD groups are likely to accept it. We test this argument using our new data in two samples of SD dispute years that are not in armed conflict. We find that mediation is more likely in dispute years outside of armed conflict where SD groups are engaged in low-level violence and in disputes in countries that border other countries that are experiencing armed conflict and less likely in disputes in states that are permanent members of the UN Security Council. This analysis shows that mediators do engage in preventive mediation in disputes that they perceive as having a higher likelihood of escalation to armed conflict, but that they are constrained in their ability to do so by geopolitics.

1 Introduction

Mediation is a tool outside actors frequently use to resolve conflicts and reduce violence. High-profile peace agreements such as the Good Friday Accords in the Northern Ireland conflict, the Oslo Accords in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the southern Sudanese conflict were all facilitated by international mediators. A range of organizations send mediators to intrastate disputes, including the United Nations (UN), regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD), and non-governmental organizations such as Swiss Peace and the Community of Sant'Egidio.

Many of the most high-profile mediation efforts, including those in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, and southern Sudan, occur in the context of intrastate violent conflict. A huge academic literature examines mediation in civil war, with analyses of both which civil wars see mediation and what the effect of this mediation is. This literature has made important contributions to our understanding of the determinants and efficacy of mediation. However, organizations such as the UN, AU, IGAD, Swiss Peace, etc., all express a commitment to preventing violent conflicts before they break out, and preventive diplomacy is frequently lauded as a conflict prevention tool.

We know much less about the determinants of when and where mediation is used for conflict prevention and whether mediation is a successful tool of conflict prevention in intrastate disputes. In this article, we seek to fill this gap by focusing on the first question– where mediation as conflict prevention occurs. We examine this using new data we have collected on the occurrence of mediation in a random sample of 57 self-determination disputes

from 1991-2015.[1] These data are, to our knowledge, the first quantitative, cross-national data on mediation outside of the context of intrastate violence. They allow us to examine the determinants of where mediation is used outside of the context of civil war.

We develop a theoretical argument that views the occurrence of preventive mediation in self-determination disputes as resulting from decisions by three actors–mediators, governments, and organizations representing self-determination groups. Since mediation is voluntary, for it to occur all three of these actors have to agree to it. We examine their incentives and actions in SD disputes that are not currently in armed conflict.

Mediators, we argue, want to target their efforts at disputes they perceive as most likely to escalate to civil war. Multiple studies demonstrate that mediation is most likely in the hardest cases, because mediators want to go where they are most needed.[2] In the context of conflict prevention, this occurs both in the disputes with the highest likelihood of escalation, and where this potential for escalation is most visible to external actors.

In these disputes, mediators will both offer to engage in mediation and use leverage to pressure governments and organizations representing self-determination groups to accept that offer. This leverage can include rhetorical pressure, as well as economic carrots (for participating) and sticks (for not participating), such as promises of aid and/or threats of sanctions. Organizations representing self-determination groups will generally be open to mediation, because they view mediated peace processes as most likely to give them what they want. In addition, they seek to avoid the costs that come from escalations to conflict, and so are most likely to accept offers of mediation when the potential for escalation is high.

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1. These disputes are from the data in Cunningham (2014).
2. See, for example, Gartner and Bercovitch (2006) and Beber (2012).

As such, we do not anticipate that much pressure is necessary for these organizations to accept mediation offers.

Governments, on the other hand, frequently need more pressure to engage in preventive mediation. While governments are also conscious of the costs of escalation, preventive mediation efforts that bring governments and non-state groups (such as organizations representing SD groups) together can suggest that governments cannot manage their internal politics without outside help. In addition, preventive mediation can grant legitimacy to SD movements by suggesting that they are actors with legitimate political grievances who deserve a seat at the table with the government. These countervailing factors mean that governments often seek to avoid mediation efforts. The primary way they do so is by working with powerful allies, either to block the efforts entirely or to limit the leverage that mediators can use to pressure them to participate.

This theoretical framework leads to three predictions for where preventive mediation is more likely in self-determination disputes. First, disputes with a higher potential for escalation will be more likely to have mediation, because this potential increases the incentives for mediators to offer mediation, and for both governments and organizations representing self-determination groups to accept it. Second, disputes that are more visible will be more likely to have mediation, because visibility increases the willingness of mediators to offer mediation and means that there is already a perception that governments face a legitimate domestic dispute that they need help managing. Third, mediation is less likely in states whose governments are powerful or have powerful allies, because powerful states can work to block mediation efforts and limit the leverage that mediators can use to pressure governments to accept them.

We test these three predictions using our new data on mediation in self-determination disputes. We limit the analyses to years outside of armed conflict, and use several measures to test the likelihood that the dispute will escalate to armed conflict, the visibility of the dispute to potential mediators, and geopolitical constraints. The analyses show that mediation is more likely in dispute years where SD groups are engaged in low-level violence and when disputes occur in countries that border countries experiencing armed conflict. Mediation, however, is generally less likely in disputes in countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The argument and analyses in this article make important contributions to our understanding of mediation and of conflict prevention more broadly. Mediation has been shown to be effective at bringing about resolutions to long-running violent conflicts.[3] It is less clear what role it can play in conflict prevention, in part because of data constraints and because of a lack of systematic study of when preventive mediation is possible. Our analyses show that, while there are important constraints on where mediators can go, mediation can be and is used to try to prevent armed conflict in self-determination disputes.

2 Existing Explanations of Mediation Selection in Civil War

Mediation is, by definition, voluntary; mediators do not have to agree to mediate disputes, and the disputants do not have to participate in mediated talks or abide by agreements reached. In addition, mediation has some potential costs to both mediators and disputants. For mediators, the main costs are the time that they devote to the mediation effort, and the potential reputational costs they incur if talks fail. For disputants, accepting mediation

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3. See, for example, Beardsley (2011) and Gartner and Bercovitch (2006).

implies that they cannot settle the dispute without outside assistance, a cost that governments are particularly conscious of. In addition, mediated agreements, while voluntary, may require disputants to make some concessions they would rather not make.

Many studies have sought to examine which civil wars see mediation.[4] In some cases, this is out of a recognition that mediation is not randomly assigned, and so examining the effect of mediation requires dealing with this non-random selection. In general, these studies conclude that the civil wars where negotiations are least likely to be successful are most likely to see mediation, and that, once this selection is dealt with, mediation makes settlement more likely (at least in the short term).

Because the determinants of when mediators offer mediation and when these offers are accepted may be different, several studies have examined mediation offers and acceptance. Scholars have argued that potential mediators are more likely to offer mediation when they have some stake in the conflict and when they anticipate that there is a chance of success for the process (Clayton and Gleditsch 2014). Having a stake in the conflict means that the potential for resolution may provide a benefit to counteract the costs of providing mediation, while the chance of success means that it is less likely the mediator will have to pay the reputational costs of a failed process. In addition, international actors are more likely to offer mediation when the potential for conflict escalation is high (Bercovitch and Houston 2000), in part because they anticipate that escalation can create spillover costs and effects for the region and potentially beyond it (Beardsley 2010).

To accept offers of mediation and the costs that come with them, disputants generally

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4. Scholars study the selection of mediation through a variety of techniques, prominent examples include (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Beber 2012; Beardsley 2011).

have to see the conflict as costly to them (Greig 2005; Melin and Svensson 2009). Governments are often hesitant to negotiate with rebel groups at all out of concern that doing so will provide them some legitimacy and recognition. For governments to agree to mediation, they have to see rebels as representing a clear threat to their power (Svensson 2007; Greig and Regan 2008).

These studies have revealed important determinants of where mediation occurs in civil war. However, they all focus on cases of mediation within and following armed conflict, and so do not directly examine where mediation is used as a tool of conflict prevention.

3 Mediation and Conflict Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes

We develop a theoretical argument to explain why some self-determination disputes that are not currently in armed conflict experience mediation and others do not. Self-determination disputes occur when an ethnonationalist group inside of one country seeks greater control over the territory that its members inhabit. This can involve demands for secession but does not have to. Many self-determination disputes occur because groups seek greater autonomy from the central government's control, which may mean having a regional government, control over their schools, the ability to collect taxes, the right to speak their own language, etc.–rather than their own state.

Self-determination disputes are a good place to examine the determinants of mediation. These disputes occur because organizations representing self-determination groups make public demands for greater self-rule. As such, they are visible to potential media-

tors, even when there is no armed conflict. In addition, many self-determination disputes experience armed conflict at some point, and disputes over self-determination are generally regarded as ones that are difficult for states and groups to resolve. This suggests that there is often a need for outside assistance to help manage these disputes. Yet, empirically, there is significant variation across these disputes in which experience mediation, as well as in whether and when armed conflict occurs.

For mediation to occur in a self-determination dispute, a potential mediator has to make an offer to mediate, and the government and at least one organization representing the self-determination group need to accept that offer. We build our theoretical framework by focusing on the conditions under which mediators make offers to mediate in self-determination disputes and governments and these organizations choose to accept these offers. We begin with a set of assumptions about the preferences for each of these actors and then examine how these preferences interact to affect the likelihood of mediation.

For mediators, consistent with the literature described above, we assume that they want to mediate in the disputes where they are most needed and where they have some potential for success. We argue that the major determinant of potential mediators' perception of the need for mediation is whether they think that the dispute is likely to escalate to armed conflict. Armed conflicts are very costly for the country within which they take place, and can also create spillover costs on neighboring countries, as well as countries further away. Organizations such as the UN, AU, Swiss Peace, and others that provide mediation have incentives to work to prevent disputes with the potential for escalation to armed conflict from escalating.

For governments and organizations representing self-determination disputes, we as-

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sume that they share a desire to avoid armed conflict. Armed conflict creates costs for both governments and self-determination groups, and these costs incentivize these actors to work to find ways to avoid armed conflict (Fearon 1995; Cunningham 2014). The literature on mediation has shown that mediation can help actors to reach settlements that they otherwise would not reach (Beardsley 2011; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006), and this means that in disputes where the potential for escalation is high governments and organizations representing self-determination disputes have incentives to accept offers of mediation.

However, while governments and organizations representing SD groups share a desire to minimize costs, they have very different preferences about the outcome of the dispute. Generally, in these disputes, governments and organizations representing SD groups have zero-sum preferences over the distribution of political power between them. Governments prefer not to dissolve power away from the center, while SD groups seek greater control over the affairs in the territory they inhabit.

Any mediated negotiation process could potentially result in some agreement, and this agreement is almost certain to include some concessions (even if very small) to the demands of the self-determination group. This means that mediated processes are likely to shift the status quo power distribution in the preferred direction fo the SD group, all else equal. Given that dynamic, we assume that organizations representing self-determination disputes are much more open to participating in a mediated negotiation process with governments than the government is.

Governments often have additional reasons not to want to participate in a mediated process, beyond the potential concessions they may have to give up, particularly in cases outside of armed conflict. When self-determination disputes escalate to armed conflict, it is

clear that governments are facing a political opposition that has some support base and that they may need some help resolving the dispute with this opposition. When disputes are not violent, however, governments will want to avoid admitting that they need outside help to manage internal affairs. Additionally, governments often seek to avoid granting legitimacy to domestic actors (particularly those that have the potential to use violence) by negotiating with them. As such, governments are very reluctant to participate in preventive mediation.

Although participation in mediation is voluntary, mediators can use leverage to try to convince actors to accept mediation offers. Leverage refers to pressure that mediators can use both to incentivize participation in a process as well as to expand the bargaining range for the actors negotiating through manipulating the costs and benefits of that process.[5] While mediators themselves may have little direct leverage, the organizations they represent, or other powerful states that back the mediation effort, can pressure governments to participate in this process. For example, if someone representing the Economic Community of West African States offers to mediate in a dispute, powerful states (such as Nigeria) within the organization can threaten economic consequences if the government does not accept these offers.

Governments are not passive actors in this interaction, however. If governments seek to avoid mediated processes because they do not want to grant legitimacy to SD groups and want to avoid granting concessions to them, they can try to prevent mediators from using this leverage by blocking the organizations and states from imposing these costs on them. Some states are powerful enough to do this on their own, but others have to work with allies

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5. This conceptualization of leverage follows from Beardsley (2011). Reid (2017) argues that there are other types of leverage that mediators can use to bring about longer lasting agreements.

to do so.

This discussion of the incentives that mediators have to offer mediation and that governments and organizations representing self-determination groups have to accept (or, in the case of governments), not accept these offers, leads to three main empirical expectations about where preventive mediation will occur. Our first expectation is that self-determination disputes with the highest likelihood of escalation to armed conflict will be most likely to have mediation:

H1: Preventive mediation is more likely in self-determination disputes with a higher risk of escalation to armed conflict.

We anticipate that mediation is more likely in disputes with a higher likelihood of escalation, ceteris paribus, because the potential costs of armed conflict provide direct incentives for mediators to offer mediation and for governments and SD groups to accept it. However, it is not just the risk of escalation that matters for offers of mediation, but also the perceived risk of escalation. One challenge of engaging in conflict prevention is that it can be difficult to identify which disputes have a higher risk of escalation. So, we anticipate that disputes that are more visible to potential mediators will be more likely to experience mediation:

H2: Preventive mediation is more likely in self-determination disputes where the potential for escalation is more visible.

As we described above, even in disputes with a high potential for escalation and where mediators have made offers of mediation, governments have incentives to work to

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avoid mediation by declining offers and by limiting the pressure mediators can put on them. Governments of powerful states and those with powerful allies are more likely to be able to do this, and this dynamic leads to our final expectation:

H3: Preventive mediation is less likely in self-determination disputes in more powerful countries and countries with powerful allies.

4 Statistical Analysis of Preventive Mediation

4.1 New Data on Mediation in SD Disputes

These three hypotheses refer to the occurrence of preventive mediation, which we define as mediation taking place in disputes that are not currently or have not recently been in armed conflict. Examining preventive mediation requires having data on a set of disputes that have the potential for armed conflict but where armed conflict has not occurred. There is no existing cross-national data that allows for this, so we use new data that we have coded for this purpose. This article is the first presentation of these data, and so we describe them in some detail here.

There are many datasets that record information on mediation efforts during and after armed conflicts. The Civil War Mediation data set (CWM) (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011) codes instance of mediation in all armed conflicts in the Uppsala Conflict Data Project/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Öberg 2020). The Managing Low-Intensity Conflict (MILC) data set (Melander, Möller, and Öberg 2009) codes information on a range of conflict management

activities, including mediation, in low-intensity (less than 1,000 battle-related deaths) armed conflicts in the ACD. The Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) data set (Croicu et al. 2013) extends the MILC data and codes third-party activity on a state-rebel group dyad level and with a more disaggregated temporal unit of analysis. The African Peace Processes (APP) data set (Duursma and Gamez 2023) codes information about all peace processes in armed conflicts in Africa in the ACD. The Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts (PNCC) data set (Arı 2023) codes information on all negotiations (whether or not they were mediated) in all armed conflicts in the ACD.

Up to this point, no dataset has existed that records mediation events for a set of intrastate disputes, both during and outside of civil conflict. To address this gap, we created the Mediation in Self-Determination Disputes data set (MSDD). We argued in the theory section that self-determination disputes are a good area for examining theoretically the determinants of mediation because they are visible to both potential mediators and researchers and because they present clear challenges to bargaining that suggest that outside diplomatic assistance may be needed. For similar reasons, these disputes are a good way to code mediation efforts without starting with armed conflicts. We can identify a set of self-determination disputes (some of which experience armed conflict and some of which do not) and then identify all instances of third-party mediation in those disputes.

The self-determination disputes in the MSDD data come from the data collected by Cunningham (2014).[6] She defines self-determination disputes as those in which "an ethnonationalist group claims a right to greater self-rule based on its identity" (Cunningham 2011). There are 146 SD disputes overall in her data, and we retained 136 of them that are

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6. Her data collection began with the list of self-determination movements in Marshall and Gurr (2003).

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active during the period of our data collection (1991-2015). We then generated a random sample and collected data on mediation efforts in the first 57 of these disputes, representing roughly 42% of the total number. Table A1 displays the full list of disputes in our sample and can be found in the Appendix.

Importantly, for the analysis of preventive mediation, the sample of 57 disputes includes those that experience civil war–such as the Tajik and Uzbek disputes in Afghanistan, the Moros in the Philippines, and Albanians in Yugoslavia–as well as those–such as the Bubis in Equatorial Guinea, Gagauz in Moldova, and Jurassians in Switzerland–that do not. In addition, within most of the disputes that experience armed conflict, there are periods with and without armed conflict. These data allow us to examine the determinants of mediation during, after, and outside of armed conflict.

In the MSDD, we define a mediation event as a meeting between one or both parties to an SD dispute (the government and at least one organization representing the SD group) and a third party in which (1) the dispute is discussed and (2) the third party shows a clear intent to have the dispute resolved peacefully, either via proclamation or action. While the parties to the dispute are either the state government, a direct affiliate, or an organization that is part of the SD movement, third parties acting as mediators may be individuals, state governments, international or non-governmental organizations, or other political entities. This mediation can comprise bilateral mediation–in which the mediator meets with only one side to try to resolve the dispute, shuttle diplomacy–in which the mediator meets with each side individually but there are not direct talks, and direct diplomacy–in which the mediator and representatives of both parties discuss the dispute.

In the main analyses presented in the next section, we only include instances of direct

mediation. We choose to focus on direct mediation since that is the most restrictive measure that represents the most public form of mediation. In addition, our theoretical argument focuses on the conditions under which potential mediators make offers for mediation, and both governments and organizations representing self-determination disputes accept these offers. A variable measuring the presence of a mediator and representatives of both sides is the clearest test of this argument. In further analyses, described after the main analyses and presented in the Appendix, we re-run our statistical models using less restrictive measures of mediation (which include bilateral mediation and shuttle diplomacy).

To identify mediation events, we coded English-language news articles after processing search results from NexisUni with a machine learning (ML) model trained on hand-coded news articles. The model assigns labels to individual news articles that reflect the probability of their containing meetings of disputants with third parties. Only news articles with a probability greater than 50% were retained for manual coding, drastically reducing the number of articles human coders have to go through while, on average, retaining a more than 80% overlap with events coded by hand only. After ML processing, human coders went through news articles, entering events in the data set using part (1) of the aforementioned definition. In the second step, events were coded as either mediation or not, using part (2) of the definition. To code mediation, coders looked for either explicit statements during or after meetings or actions like shuttle diplomacy as evidence of a third party's interest in peaceful conflict resolution.

With this methodology, we have identified 1,317 mediation events for 53 disputes spanning 1,325 dispute-years.[7] This is a substantially higher number of mediation events

7. For four of the 57 disputes in the data–Croatia - Serbs, South Africa - Zulus, Ukraine - Crimean

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Table 1: Cross-tabulation of Direct Mediation and Armed Conflict Incidence per Year

Mediation	Armed Conflict		
	No	Yes	Row total
No	850	146	996
	85.3%	14.7%	85.6%
Yes	89	79	168
	53.0%	47.0%	14.4%
Column total	939	225	1164

than is found in any existing cross-national data set. This is true because the MSDD identify mediation events in disputes such as the Flemings in Belgium, Hungarians in Slovakia, Muslims in Sri Lanka, and indigenous groups in Mexico and Colombia that never experience armed conflict. In addition, the MSDD identify greater numbers of mediation events in years during and after armed conflict than other data sets that also code these periods.

In this article, we focus on whether or nor preventive mediation occurs in a self-determination dispute year that is not in armed conflict, and so we do not include information about the number of mediation events in each year. In Table 1, we compare the number of dispute years with mediation in, and not in, armed conflict. We find that a majority of years with mediation take place outside of the context of civil war. Table 1 shows the importance of the MSDD data, since it allows for examining a range of mediation efforts that are left out of existing civil war mediation datasets. In addition, it highlights that mediation in self-determination disputes does take place outside of the context of civil war.

Russians, and Pakistan - Baluchis–we coded the occurence of mediation on an annual basis, rather than coding all mediation events in the year. These disputes are included in the empirical analyses (which use a dichotomous measure of mediation as the dependent variable).

4.2 Measuring Preventive Mediation

As described above, we define preventive mediation as mediation that takes place outside of the context of armed conflict. One challenge with studying conflict prevention generally is that mediation efforts often continue for years after armed conflicts have ended. At what point after conflicts end does mediation become an effort to prevent the outbreak of a new conflict, as opposed to manage the resolution of a previous one? There is no clear answer to this question, as any coding rule focused on a specific increment of time is essentially arbitrary.

To deal with this, we create from our data two samples of SD dispute years that are not currently in armed conflict. The first sample only excludes years in active armed conflict, as defined by the ACD. This means that that sample includes all years preceding and following armed conflicts in self-determination disputes between 1991 and 2015, as well as all years for disputes that did not experience an armed conflict in that time period. That sample has 939 dispute years, as compared to 1,216 when years of armed conflict are included. The second sample is more restrictive, and only includes years in the SD dispute before an armed conflict occurs, or in disputes that have not experienced an armed conflict. We measure armed conflict in the dispute since 1960, meaning that even if a dispute only experienced one year of armed conflict in the 1960s all dispute years from 1991-2015 would be excluded from this sample. That sample has 786 observations.

Within each of these samples, we have our dichotomous measure of direct mediation, which is the dependent variable in the analyses. In sample one, there are 89 dispute years that see at least one direct mediation effort. In sample two, there are 68. This means that in

each sample there are roughly nine percent of the dispute years that experience mediation.

4.3   Independent Variables

Our theoretical framework led to three hypotheses about the conditions under which preventive mediation occurs in self-determination disputes. We use a set of variables to test each of these hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 is that mediation is more likely in self-determination dispute years with a higher chance of escalation to armed conflict. To identify the risk of esaclation, we draw on the work of Cunningham (2013, 2014). She has identified several conditions that affect whether armed conflicts occur in self-determination disputes.

Cunningham (2013) argues that civil war is more likely when SD groups have a greater number of organizations making claims on their behalf. We include a logged measure of the number of organizations active in the group in each year from her data. Her research has also shown that these organizations engage in a variety of types of behavior, including protest, conventional politics, and violence. The Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP) (Cunningham, Dahl, and Frugé 2020) contains yearly organizational level data on the use of a variety of tactics by each of the organizations in Cunningham's (2013) data. We draw on these data to create a variable measuring the ratio of factions representing the SD group that used violent tactics in a given dispute year. When factions are using violence but the dispute is not in armed conflict, this increases the risk that the dispute will escalate to civil war.

We also include a variable indicating whether the government has previously given

concessions to the SD group. The variable is a binary measure of previous concessions at any prior point in the data (which begin in 1960), taking a value of "1" if a given SD movement has received either cultural or political concessions in the past. Cunningham (2013) finds that a history of concessions makes civil war in these disputes less likely and argues that they could indicate that governments are interested in peaceful resolution of disputes. This interest could increase the likelihood of mediation as well. Data for this variable is obtained from the updated SRDP.

Hypothesis 2 is that mediation will be more likely in self-determination disputes that are more visible to potential mediators. We include several variables that we anticipate could impact the visibility of these disputes. First, when another armed conflict is taking place either in the same state or the region, these armed conflicts attract international attention. This attention can lead mediators to pay attention to other disputes that appear to have characteristics making escalation more likely.[8] We measure the presence of another conflict in the same state using the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). That variable is measured "1" if there is an armed conflict in the country that does not involve the SD group in the year, and "0" otherwise. In addition, we use the Armed Conflict Dataset together with the CShapes dataset (Schvitz et al. 2022) to create a neighboring conflict variable in line with Gleditsch (2007). This variable is binary, receiving a "1" if any country with a 950 km or less capital distance to the country engaged in an SD dispute experiences intrastate conflict in a given year, and "0" otherwise.

The presence of a peace operation in the country can also affect the visibility to

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8. Consistent with this expectation, White, Cunningham, and Beardsley (2018) find that the UN Security Council is more likely to issue resolutions related to self-determination disputes when there is an armed conflict in a country neighboring the state where the dispute takes place.

mediators, even if this peace operation does not take place in the territory of the self-determination dispute at all. When the UN or another actor is leading a peace operation, they have access to more information about disputes in the country and the potential for armed conflict. Having personnel on the ground can also make it easier to identify potential mediators and so increase the likelihood of mediation. We include dichotomous variables measuring whether there is a UN peace operation or non-UN peacekeeping mission in the country in the year. The data on UN peace operations is taken from the Peace Mission Mandate Database (Hellmüller, Tan, and Bara 2024), and takes a value of "1" if the UN had a Peacekeeping Operation or Special Political Mission in the country in the year. The data on non-UN peacekeeping is taken from Bara and Hultman (2020) and takes a value of "1" if there is a non-UN led peacekeeping mission present in the country in the year.

Hypothesis 3 expects that mediation will be less likely in countries that are more powerful or have powerful allies. The effect of power is particularly likely to play out within organizations such as the United Nations, as countries that have a veto in the Security Council can block that body from authorizing rhetorical and economic tools that mediators can use as leverage to push governments to engage in mediation. To test this expectation, we include a dichotomous measure of whether the country is one of the five permanent members of the UNSC (the United States, Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom).

We also include a measure of whether the country is a former French colony. After independence, France has kept close ties with governments in its former colonies, particularly in Africa. This has included a willingness in some cases to intervene militarily to support these governments. These close ties mean that France may work to block mediation efforts in its former colonies, even if they do not have a formal alliance. We include a measure

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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Direct mediation	939	0.095	0.293	0	1
Violent tactics (lag)	879	0.102	0.246	0.000	1.000
Number of factions (log, lag)	867	0.775	0.762	0.000	2.639
Previous concessions (lag)	926	0.477	0.500	0	1
Direct mediation (lag)	906	0.097	0.296	0	1
Neighboring conflict (lag)	926	0.590	0.492	0	1
Other civil war in state (lag)	922	0.310	0.463	0	1
UN peace mission (lag)	902	0.263	0.440	0	1
Non-UN peace mission (lag)	902	0.105	0.307	0	1
P5 member	939	0.095	0.293	0	1
Former French colony	939	0.070	0.256	0	1

of whether the country with the self-determination dispute was a French colony using the COW Colonial Contiguity dataset (Correlates of War Project 2017).

In addition to these variables to test the three hypotheses, we include a lagged measure of direct mediation, to deal with the fact that there is quite a bit of path dependence to mediation efforts. Table 2 provides summary statistics for preventive mediation and all independent variables we use in the analyses. These summary statistics are from Sample 1.

4.4   Results

Table 3 reports the results of logistic regression analyses across our two samples. The first three models are in the sample of SD dispute years that only excludes years of active armed conflict, while the second three are in the sample that excludes all years during and following armed conflict in the dispute since 1960. Models 1 and 4 include just the independent

variables testing Hypothesis 1 (with the lagged measure of mediation), Models 2 and 5 add the variables testing Hypothesis 2, and Models 3 and 6 include all independent variables.

The analyses in Table 3 show some support for Hypothesis 1. In particular, the measure of SD organizations using violent tactics is always positive, as expected, and is statistically significant in models 2, 3, 5, and 6. That suggests that mediation is more likely in dispute years outside of armed conflict when there is a higher level of violent activity in the dispute. Neither the variable measuring the number of SD factions nor the measure of previous concessions is near statistical significance. This may be because the use of violence is the most obvious sign that disputes are at risk of escalation to armed conflict, while these other factors might increase the risk of armed conflict overall but not pose as direct a threat of escalation in the short term. Because the use of violence by organizations representing SD groups is likely to be quite visible, this variable could really be testing both of the first two hypotheses.

The results on the variables included to test Hypothesis 2 are more fixed. On the one hand, the neighboring conflict variable is positive and significant in all models, as expected. This suggests that mediation is more likely in disputes which are not in armed conflict when a neighboring country is in armed conflict. It is also consistent with the finding in White, Cunningham, and Beardsley (2018) that the UN Security Council is more likely to issue resolutions related to self-determination disputes when those disputes border countries in armed conflict. The measure of other armed conflict in the state is negative (and statistically significant in the sample only excluding years of armed conflict), which is contrary to our expectations. Because we exclude years where the SD group is engaged in armed conflict from both samples, this variable only includes cases where there is an armed conflict in the

Table 3: Logit models of Direct Mediation Incidence in State-SD Movement Dyads, 1991–2015

	Sample one: No active war			Sample two: No war post-1960		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Violent tactics (lag)	0.855	1.178**	1.216**	0.730	1.273**	1.215**
	(0.477)	(0.455)	(0.441)	(0.478)	(0.425)	(0.429)
Number of factions (log,lag)	0.226	0.349	0.159	−0.049	−0.141	−0.147
	(0.277)	(0.269)	(0.214)	(0.316)	(0.298)	(0.294)
Previous concessions (lag)	0.090	0.124	0.299	0.102	0.308	0.237
	(0.452)	(0.397)	(0.454)	(0.552)	(0.557)	(0.581)
Neighboring conflict (lag)		0.761*	1.011**		1.485***	1.430***
		(0.357)	(0.318)		(0.358)	(0.367)
Other civil war in state (lag)		−1.114*	−1.132*		−0.977	−0.968
		(0.436)	(0.501)		(0.571)	(0.577)
UN peace mission (lag)		0.574	0.971		1.092	1.029
		(0.574)	(0.667)		(0.758)	(0.799)
Non-UN peace mission (lag)		0.096	0.077		0.032	0.013
		(0.725)	(0.712)		(0.761)	(0.759)
P5 Member			1.475*			−13.969***
			(0.651)			(0.513)
Former French Colony			0.751			−0.243
			(0.705)			(1.073)
Direct mediation (lag)	3.746***	3.499***	3.305***	3.869***	3.276***	3.258***
	(0.453)	(0.466)	(0.552)	(0.527)	(0.609)	(0.604)
(Intercept)	−3.695***	−4.261***	−4.690***	−3.553***	−4.911***	−4.740***
	(0.476)	(0.425)	(0.458)	(0.537)	(0.538)	(0.569)
Num.Obs.	832	832	832	686	686	686
AIC	325.9	318.1	315.5	252.3	236.4	239.2
BIC	349.6	360.6	367.5	274.9	277.2	289.0
RMSE	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.20
Std.Errors	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the self-determination dispute.
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

country that the SD group is not involved in. It may be that violent conflict has some limiting effect on the willingness of mediators to mediate in other disputes in the country not directly involved in the armed conflict.

The UN peace operation variable is positive across all models in which it is included, but not quite statistically significant in any. The non-UN peacekeeping variable has a coefficient that is very close to zero and nowhere near significance.

The results for Hypothesis 3 are interesting. The P5 member variable has opposite effects across the two models, and has a nonsensical coefficient in Model 6. These differences are driven by the fact that the only cases of mediation in a P5 member in either sample is the Northern Ireland dispute in the UK, which sees direct mediation in most years in the data. Since that dispute has only experienced armed conflict in 1991 and 1998, there are 17 years in the first sample with a "1" on mediation and a "1" on the P5 member variable, which explains the positive and significant effect of that variable. That dispute, however, is excluded from sample two, leading to the nonsensical coefficient on the "P5member" variable, because being a permanent member of the Security Council perfectly predicts no mediation in that sample, meaning there is separation in the analysis with that variable included. We see this as general evidence that powerful states can resist mediation efforts in their disputes, with the exception of the case of Northern Ireland. The former French colony variable, meanwhile, is not significant in either model.

Across all six models, the variable measuring the one-year lag of mediation incidence is positive with a large coefficient and highly significant. This is as expected, given that mediation efforts within disputes often continue for many years.

Taken together, the analyses in Table 3 show several patterns consistent with our

theoretical expectations. Generally, mediation is more common in disputes outside of armed conflict where organizations are engaged in violence, that border countries that are experiencing armed conflict, and outside of powerful states (with the exception of the Northern Ireland dispute). To examine how the sets of variables measuring each hypothesis generally affects our ability to predict mediation we follow Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) and conduct k-fold cross validation, and examine the area under the curve of a ROC plot of four models. The first model only includes the mediation lag, and so shows the baseline predictions that we generate just by predicting whether or not mediation occurs in a dispute year based on whether it occurred in the prior year. The second model adds the variables to test Hypothesis 1, the third adds the variables testing Hypothesis 2, and the fourth includes all the variables testing Hypotheses 1-3. We do this for both of our samples of dispute years outside of armed conflict. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the ROC plots and report the AUC for these four models in sample one and sample two, respectively.

The ROC plots show that the baseline model, which includes the lag of mediation, does quite well in predicting mediation occurrence on its own, with an AUC of 0.77 in sample one and 0.80 in sample two. In sample one, adding the variables that test Hypothesis 1 increases the out-of-sample predictive power by quite a bit (the AUC increases to 0.84), while adding the remaining variables increases it a bit more (to 0.85)[9]. The differences are smaller in Figure 2, but adding all the variables increases the out of sample AUC from a little under 0.8 to a little over 0.82. We generally view these ROC plots as showing that the variables testing the theoretical arguments in this paper do improve the ability to predict

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9. Because these ROC plots are out of sample, the AUC can go down even when additional variables are added, as happens slightly in both plots when certain variables are added

Figure 1: ROC Plot of Sample 1

the occurence of mediation out of sample.

5 Further Analyses

We conduct a series of further analyses to examine the robustness of these results. We describe them briefly here and include tables in the Appendix.

The first additional analyses examine whether the results are driven by the effect of our measure of mediation. The analyses in Table 3 show patterns across self-determination disputes in the occurrence of direct mediation. This measure of direct mediation only includes cases where the mediator, a representative of the state government, and a representative of

Figure 2: ROC Plot of Sample 2

the self-determination group were present in the same process. This means that the measure excludes bilateral mediation and shuttle diplomacy, both of which are coded in the MSDD. In additional analyses, we have re-run the models from Table 3 with two less restrictive measures of mediation. The analyses in Table A2 use as the dependent variable a measure of mediation occurrence that includes both direct mediation and shuttle diplomacy (where mediators meet with both sides but the two sides do not talk directly). Using this measure of mediation, there are 96 years with mediation in sample one and 72 in sample two, as compared to 89 and 68, respectively, with the more restrictive measure used in Table 3. The analyses in Table A3 use the least restrictive measure of mediation, which includes all instances of direct mediation, shuttle diplomacy, and bilateral negotiations (in which the

mediator meets with one side individually). Using that measure, there are 144 years of mediation in sample one and 111 in sample two.

The results in Tables A2 and A3 generally show the same patterns as in Table 3 but with less statistical significance. In Table A2, the measure of neighboring conflict is positive and significant in all four models and the P5 member variable remains negative and significant with a nonsensical coefficient in Model 6. The measure of violent tactics is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. In Table A3, none of the variables achieve statistical significance at the 0.05 level, with the exception of the P5 member and mediation lag variables. These additional analyses suggest that our theoretical argument provides a better explanation of direct mediation than bilateral mediation or shuttle diplomacy. As we described above, we consider the measure of direct mediation to be the most direct test of our theoretical argument.

The second additional analyses examine the effect of the variables included in Table 3 in the full set of SD dispute-years, including those that are in active armed conflict. Adding years of armed conflict adds more than 200 dispute years beyond those in Table 3 Models 1-3. In this larger sample, we replicate the analyses in Table 3 and add a variable measuring whether there is armed conflict in the prior year.

The results, presented in Table A4 show some interesting differences with the samples of dispute years outside of armed conflict included in our main analyses. The group civil war variable is positive and significant (in Models 2 and 3), as is the measure of the SD movement organizations using violence (which is significant in all three models). None of the other variables are significant, however, including the neighboring conflict variable or the P5 measure (which now has a reasonable, positive, coefficient). We see these differences

as suggesting that, in the full sample of years, the presence of violence (which is picked up both by armed conflict and by the organizational violence measure) is the main driver of whether or not mediation occurs, but that there is interesting variation within the years not in armed conflict, and thus studying preventive mediation directly is important.

The third and final additional analyses add additional controls to the analyses in Table 3. In Table A5 we include a measure of whether the country is a democracy drawn from the VDEM data, creating a binary indicator of electoral democracy from the Regimes of the world indices (Coppedge et al. 2024) and a measure of whether the country is an ally of a member of the P5 (this variable is from Gibler (2009). We did not include the P5 ally variable in the main models in Table 3 because it has missing values for approximately 20% of our observations.

In Table A5 neither the democracy nor P5 ally variables are statistically significant. The other variables generally show the same patterns as in Table 3 with one exception. The non-UN peacekeeping mission variable is positive and statistically significant in Model 6 (and close to significant in Model 3). When we dig into the data, we find that this switcch happens because none of the dispute years with non-UN peacekeeping missions take place in countries for which we lose values when the P5 ally variable is included, and this changes the results. This nonrandomness of the high degree of missingness of this variable is why we do not include it in the main table.

6 Conclusion

Mediation is a key tool of international conflict management. A large number of studies have shown that mediation efforts can contribute to shorter civil wars, reductions in violence in ongoing wars, and longer-lasting peace agreements. This literature broadly suggests that the world would be a more violent place without international mediation.

Yet mediators do not go everywhere. A range of scholars have examined how the characteristics of armed conflicts affect whether or not they see mediation. Our analysis contributes to that literature by looking beyond civil war and examining the occurrence and frequency of mediation in a set of intrastate disputes–self-determination disputes. Studying conflict prevention in these disputes is important because they often persist for decades and they result in a substantial share of global civil wars.

The statistical analyses that we conduct in two samples of dispute years outside of armed conflict reveal some interesting patterns. First, they show that, even outside of armed conflict, violence is still a driving force behind where mediation occurs. In our first sample, which only excludes years of armed conflict, this could be picking up lingering violence after conflicts have dropped below the battledeath threshold used to measure armed conflict, and where peace processes are still continuing. But the results still hold in the second sample, which excludes any post-armed conflict years as well. Violence, even low level violence, can signal to mediators, governments, and SD groups that mediation is needed to resolve disputes.

Second, the results show that mediation is more likely in disputes in countries that border other countries that have armed conflicts. Academic studies have demonstrated that

civil conflicts often spread beyond their borders (Gleditsch 2007), and the pattern we find here suggests that mediators pay attention to the potential for this conflict diffusion when deciding where to offer mediation, and governments and representatives of SD groups take it into account when deciding whether to accept these offers. This pattern of international actors acting proactively to prevent the spread of civil war happened with preventive diplomacy (and peacekeeping) in Macedonia in the early 1990s.

Finally, our analysis shows that there are significant geopolitical constraints on preventive mediation. In our data, 25 of the 57 disputes experience at least one year of direct mediation. There are 5 disputes that take place in permanent five members of the UN Security Council, and the only one that experiences mediation is the Northern Ireland dispute in the UK. That mediation effort followed many years of disruptive violent conflict.

Overall, then, the analyses and argument in this paper show that mediation is used as a tool of conflict prevention in self-determination disputes, but that there are significant constraints on when and where mediators can go. There are a number of avenues of further research that could add to our understanding of the role of mediation in conflict prevention and resolution.

First, analyses using the MSDD data could examine whether certain types of mediators are more likely to mediate in certain types of self-determination disputes. The MSDD data contain information on which third parties were present in these mediation efforts, and they comprise a range of actors representing international organizations, regional organizations, national governments, NGOs, or working as individuals. Existing studies have suggested that certain types of mediators may be more effective (Duursma 2020), and examining who mediates in which kinds of disputes could contribute to our understanding of

these patterns.

Second, further research could examine the effect of these mediation efforts on a variety of outcomes, both inside and outside of armed conflict. While in this article we focus the analysis on a dichotomous measure of whether or not mediation occurs in a SD dispute year, our data contain information on all of the mediation efforts that take place, including when there is more than one effort in a year. Many of the dispute years in our data experience multiple efforts. Existing studies of the effect of mediation tend to examine large macro-outcomes such as civil war termination or peace agreement duration. Our data allows for analyzing the impact of specific mediation efforts on more micro-outcomes, such as limited ceasefires or specific instances of cooperation, providing a fuller examination of their overall effect.

Finally, the MSDD data could be used to study whether and how mediation plays a role in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict. Many of the same organizations that deploy mediators to active armed conflicts express a commitment to conflict prevention. Our analysis here shows that, in some cases, they are able to overcome constraints and engage in mediation in disputes without a recent history of armed conflict. A next step is to examine whether and how these efforts are effective at preventing those armed conflicts from happening at all.

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Appendix A

Table A1: Sample Disputes and Date Ranges

KGCID	Dispute	Range
101.00	Afghanistan - Tajiks	1991-2015
235.00	Afghanistan - Uzbeks	1991-2015
102.00	Algeria - Berbers	1991-2015
301.00	Angola - Cabindans	1991-2015
402.00	Belgium - Flemings	1991-2008
104.00	Belgium - Walloons	1991-2015
141.00	Bhutan - Lhotshampas	1991-2015
403.00	Cameroon - Westerners	1991-2015
404.00	Chad - Southerners	1991-2005
107.00	Colombia - Indigenous Peoples	1991-2015
306.00	Congo-Kinshasa - Bakongo	1991-2015
406.00	Congo-Kinshasa - Lunda and Yeke	1991-2005
307.00	Croatia - Serbs	1991-2015
108.00	Cyprus - Turkish Cypriots	1991-2015
308.00	Equatorial Guinea - Bubis	1991-2005
309.00	Ethiopia - Oromos	1991-2015
207.00	France - Bretons	1991-2004
310.00	Georgia - Adzhars	1991-2005
311.00	Georgia - South Ossetians	1991-2015
410.00	India - Assamese	1991-2015
210.00	India - Reang (Bru)	1996-2015
313.00	India - Tripuras	1991-2015
413.00	Indonesia - Acehnese	1991-2005
214.00	Laos - Hmong	1991-2005
118.00	Mexico - Indigenous Peoples (non-Mayan or Zapotecs)	1995-2015
119.00	Moldova - Gagauz	1991-2015
121.00	Myanmar - Kachins	1991-2015
120.00	Myanmar - Rohingyas	1991-2015
217.00	Myanmar - Shan	1991-2015

KGCID	Dispute	Range
122.00	Niger - Tuaregs	1991-2000
219.00	Nigeria - Ibos	1991-2015
422.00	Pakistan - Baluchis	1991-2015
139.00	Pakistan - Sarakis	1991-2015
424.00	Philippines - Moros	1991-2015
223.00	Russia - Buryat	1991-2010
326.00	Russia - Kumyks	1991-2005
225.00	Senegal - Casamacias	1991-2015
327.00	Slovakia - Hungarians	1992-2013
427.00	Somalia - Puntland Darods	1998-2015
129.00	South Africa - Afrikaners	1993-2015
329.00	South Africa - Zulus	1991-2015
130.00	Sri Lanka - Muslims	1991-2015
330.00	Sudan - Southerners	1991-2015
430.00	Switzerland - Jurassians	1991-2005
228.00	Tanzania - Zanzibaris	1991-2015
431.00	Thailand - Malay-Muslims	1991-2015
134.00	Ukraine - Crimean Russians	1991-2015
229.00	Ukraine - Crimean Tatars	1991-2015
230.00	United Kingdom - Catholics	1991-2015
333.00	United Kingdom - Cornish	1991-2015
335.00	Yugoslavia - Albanians	1991-2015
336.00	Yugoslavia - Montenegrins	1991-2006
436.00	Yugoslavia - Sandzak Muslims	1991-2015
138.00	Zambia - Lozi	1992-2015
234.00	Zimbabwe - Ndebele	1991-2005

Appendix B

Table A2: Logit models of Shuttle and Direct Mediation Incidence in State-SD Movement Dyads, 1991–2015

	Sample one: No active war			Sample two: No war post-1960		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Violent tactics (lag)	0.649	0.670	0.525	0.719	0.471	0.448
	(0.596)	(0.610)	(0.601)	(0.653)	(0.628)	(0.627)
Factions (log,lag)	0.331	0.456*	0.380	0.133	0.142	0.137
	(0.228)	(0.223)	(0.197)	(0.263)	(0.268)	(0.265)
Previous concessions (lag)	0.277	0.235	0.322	0.394	0.648	0.547
	(0.436)	(0.372)	(0.403)	(0.528)	(0.543)	(0.558)
Neighboring conflict (lag)		0.667*	0.834*		1.015*	0.957*
		(0.322)	(0.349)		(0.434)	(0.434)
Other civil war in state (lag)		−0.915*	−0.859		−0.639	−0.609
		(0.440)	(0.461)		(0.601)	(0.616)
UN peace mission (lag)		0.698	0.866		1.330	1.218
		(0.610)	(0.632)		(0.737)	(0.776)
Non-UN peace mission (lag)		−0.171	−0.149		−0.296	−0.302
		(0.805)	(0.800)		(0.851)	(0.852)
P5 member			0.951			−14.424***
			(0.594)			(0.544)
Former French Colony			0.302			−0.550
			(0.650)			(1.034)
Direct mediation (lag)	3.588***	3.358***	3.247***	3.603***	2.963***	2.949***
	(0.635)	(0.514)	(0.543)	(0.820)	(0.621)	(0.625)
(Intercept)	−3.600***	−4.006***	−4.252***	−3.511***	−4.501***	−4.289***
	(0.475)	(0.420)	(0.484)	(0.561)	(0.582)	(0.627)
Num.Obs.	773	773	773	627	627	627
AIC	350.2	343.6	344.6	276.1	262.3	264.3
BIC	373.5	385.4	395.7	298.3	302.3	313.1
RMSE	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.22	0.22
Std.Errors	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the self-determination dispute.
$p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A3: Logit models of Bilateral, Shuttle and Direct Mediation Incidence in State-SD Movement Dyads, 1991–2015

	Sample one: No active war			Sample two: No war post-1960		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Violent tactics (lag)	0.909	0.919	0.942	0.996	0.916	0.926
	(0.536)	(0.555)	(0.547)	(0.628)	(0.611)	(0.612)
Factions (log,lag)	0.289	0.329	0.322	0.150	0.122	0.113
	(0.217)	(0.203)	(0.191)	(0.261)	(0.251)	(0.247)
Previous concessions (lag)	0.038	0.004	−0.031	0.198	0.276	0.129
	(0.339)	(0.304)	(0.315)	(0.413)	(0.402)	(0.421)
Neighboring conflict (lag)		0.303	0.308		0.433	0.368
		(0.342)	(0.327)		(0.403)	(0.408)
Other civil war in state (lag)		−0.616	−0.598		−0.530	−0.473
		(0.371)	(0.364)		(0.450)	(0.458)
UN peace mission (lag)		0.390	0.342		0.809	0.630
		(0.606)	(0.614)		(0.703)	(0.743)
Non-UN peace mission (lag)		−0.211	−0.209		−0.342	−0.346
		(0.770)	(0.775)		(0.810)	(0.828)
P5 member			0.193			−15.724***
			(0.620)			(0.445)
Former French colony			−0.869			−1.572
			(0.517)			(0.902)
Mediation (lag)	3.063***	2.951***	2.939***	3.033***	2.783***	2.703***
	(0.455)	(0.375)	(0.377)	(0.559)	(0.415)	(0.433)
(Intercept)	−2.881***	−2.956***	−2.896***	−2.835***	−3.129***	−2.816***
	(0.370)	(0.386)	(0.406)	(0.428)	(0.481)	(0.518)
Num.Obs.	773	773	773	627	627	627
AIC	498.0	498.6	499.8	400.2	397.1	392.1
BIC	521.2	540.4	550.9	422.5	437.1	441.0
RMSE	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.29
Std.Errors	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the self-determination dispute.
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table A4: Logit models of Direct Mediation Incidence in State-SD Movement Dyads 1991–2015, Full Sample (including armed conflicts)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Violent tactics (lag)	1.293**	1.432**	1.401**
	(0.489)	(0.458)	(0.447)
Factions (log,lag)	0.225	0.334	0.265
	(0.273)	(0.236)	(0.206)
Previous concessions (lag)	0.131	0.192	0.203
	(0.370)	(0.341)	(0.362)
Group civil war (lag)	0.742	0.927*	1.059**
	(0.409)	(0.371)	(0.349)
Neighboring conflict (lag)		0.378	0.456
		(0.307)	(0.303)
Other civil war in state (lag)		−0.698	−0.685
		(0.368)	(0.370)
UN peace mission (lag)		−0.015	0.014
		(0.450)	(0.473)
Non-UN peace mission (lag)		0.771	0.805
		(0.610)	(0.613)
P5 member			0.730
			(0.538)
Former French colony			−0.216
			(0.453)
Directed mediation (lag)	3.312***	3.217***	3.176***
	(0.357)	(0.352)	(0.376)
(Intercept)	−3.589***	−3.889***	−3.953***
	(0.455)	(0.373)	(0.387)
Num.Obs.	1038	1038	1038
AIC	529.7	525.9	527.4
BIC	559.4	575.4	586.7
RMSE	0.27	0.26	0.26
Std.Errors	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the self-determination dispute.
$p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A5: Logit models of Direct Mediation Incidence in State-SD Movement Dyads, 1991–2015, with additional controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Violent tactics (lag)	0.855	1.178**	0.890	0.730	1.273**	0.618
	(0.477)	(0.455)	(0.616)	(0.478)	(0.425)	(0.647)
Factions (log,lag)	0.226	0.349	0.311	−0.049	−0.141	−0.303
	(0.277)	(0.269)	(0.273)	(0.316)	(0.298)	(0.350)
Previous concessions (lag)	0.090	0.124	−0.298	0.102	0.308	−1.265
	(0.452)	(0.397)	(0.681)	(0.552)	(0.557)	(0.704)
Neighboring conflict (lag)		0.761*	1.128**		1.485***	1.208*
		(0.357)	(0.427)		(0.358)	(0.510)
Other civil war in state (lag)		−1.114*	−1.031		−0.977	−0.383
		(0.436)	(0.745)		(0.571)	(0.661)
UN peace mission (lag)		0.574	−1.007		1.092	−1.656
		(0.574)	(1.002)		(0.758)	(1.017)
Non-UN peace mission (lag)		0.096	1.608		0.032	1.879*
		(0.725)	(0.834)		(0.761)	(0.890)
Democracy			−0.461			−0.563
			(0.510)			(0.721)
P5 ally			0.140			0.018
			(0.556)			(0.567)
P5 member			1.301			−16.121***
			(0.925)			(0.751)
Former French colony			0.873			−0.323
			(0.801)			(1.125)
Directed Mediation (lag)	3.746***	3.499***	3.407***	3.869***	3.276***	3.208***
	(0.453)	(0.466)	(0.708)	(0.527)	(0.609)	(0.800)
(Intercept)	−3.695***	−4.261***	−4.214***	−3.553***	−4.911***	−3.084***
	(0.476)	(0.425)	(0.568)	(0.537)	(0.538)	(0.758)
Num.Obs.	832	832	620	686	686	519
AIC	325.9	318.1	233.8	252.3	236.4	164.5
BIC	349.6	360.6	291.4	274.9	277.2	219.8
RMSE	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.19
Std.Errors	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid	by: kgcid

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the self-determination dispute.
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.