

International Influences on Nonviolent and Violent Contention

Jori Breslawski
University of Maryland

David E. Cunningham
University of Maryland & Peace Research Institute Oslo

Abstract: How do international actors influence dissidents' decisions whether to challenge their states using violent means, nonviolence, both or neither? We argue that international influences can have important effects on the motivation dissidents have to challenge their governments as well as the political opportunity structure for violent and nonviolent contention. We examine the effect of two prominent types of actors—powerful democratic states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs) on dissident behavior in all national level elections in Africa from 2000-2012. Using integrated data drawn from four leading conflict events datasets, we find that dissidents are less likely to engage in violent contention when their government receives higher levels of military aid from the United States and in former French colonies, and more likely to engage in both violent and nonviolent contention when their state is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs.

Acknowledgements: Previous versions of this paper were presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, San Francisco, CA, September 1-4th 2017 & the Peace Science Society (International) meeting, Tempe, AZ, November 8-10, 2017. We thank Alex Braithwaite, Ursula Daxecker, Johannes Karreth, and Inken von Borzyskowski for helpful comments.

Civil wars, such as those currently raging in Syria and Yemen and mass nonviolent protest campaigns, like those occurring in Venezuela from 2014-2017 and Egypt in 2011, happen because dissidents make decisions to take up arms or go out into the streets in protest. A large literature has examined the interaction between states and dissidents that affect these decisions, with a particular focus on how state repression and dissident-led contention influence each other.

Much less is known, however, about what international influences impact dissidents' decisions whether to take up arms, go out into the streets to protest, or to stay home. While the literature has examined how international action influences dynamics of conflicts once they've begun, we know much less about the effect of international influences on the state-dissident interaction before dissidents initiate violence or take to the streets in mass numbers.¹ However, dissidents certainly consider the response of international actors when deciding whether and how to challenge their states. During the "Arab Spring" of 2010/2011, for example, dissidents across the Middle East/North Africa region watched as international actors did not come to the aid of governments in Tunisia and Egypt and backed rebels in Libya, and this international involvement (or lack thereof) contributed to a spread of dissent across the region.

In this article, we examine the effect of international influences on dissident strategic choice in a broader set of cases than civil wars or mass nonviolent campaign. We focus specifically on two types of actors that are frequently present in developing countries and that we expect to have a strong influence on dissident decision-making—powerful democratic states with close ties to the government and a particular set of International Organizations, those that Tir and Karreth (2018) refer to as Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs). We develop a theory

¹ A few studies (including Jenne 2004, Cetinyan 2002, and Thyne 2009) do look at international influences on the behavior of potential rebels in the pre-civil war period.

examining how these actors can influence the motivation for dissidents to challenge governments as well as the political opportunity structure that influences both whether and how dissidents decide to do so.

We test implications of this argument by focusing specifically on the effect of powerful states with close ties to the government and HSIPOs on dissident-led contention (both violent and nonviolent) around elections. We focus on elections for two reasons. First, elections are a time when dissidents are increasingly likely to be mobilized, as they can provide focal points for organizing dissent.² Elections tend to be particularly contentious in developing democracies as less checks on executive power and clientelist relationships mean actors see elections as very consequential. Still, contention around most elections in developing democracies does not rise to the level of civil war or mass nonviolent campaign. As such, we can examine the effect of international influences on dissident decision-making in cases with the potential for violent and nonviolent mobilization but where, in many cases, large-scale violent and nonviolent contention has yet to break out.

Second, international actors recognize that elections are potentially contentious and pay particular attention to countries around election period.³ Dissidents should be aware of this increased attention and condition their behavior according to their expectations of the effect of international involvement. As such, elections represent a time when we would expect international influences to have a clear effect.

² Harish and Little (2017) show formally that elections can reduce the overall level of political violence in societies, but that this violence is expected to spike around elections.

³ Focusing on elections has the added advantage that we can draw on very large literatures on violence and protests around elections.

To examine the level and type of dissident-led contention around elections, we use new integrated data drawn from four leading conflict event datasets.⁴ These integrated data allow us to examine both violent and nonviolent activity, and to separate out dissident-led activity from that led by the state. Using these data allows us to directly test the effect of international influences on both violent and nonviolent dissident-led contention. Our empirical analysis shows that the presence of international actors exerts a substantial influence on dissident-led conflict events. Specifically, we find that when governments have close ties to a powerful state there is less violent contention, but that governments constrained by membership in a greater number of Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations see higher levels of both violent and nonviolent contention.

Dissident Strategic Choice Around Elections

We build a theoretical framework examining international influences on dissident strategic choice in the context of elections in three steps. First, we draw on literatures focused on the repression-dissent nexus as well as bargaining approaches to develop a basic framework for state-dissident interactions. Second, we draw on literatures on electoral violence and protest to examine how this general model applies specifically in the case of elections. Third, we present our argument for how international factors can affect dissident strategic choice around elections in light of the basic model established.

We argue that both violent intrastate conflicts and mass nonviolent protest campaigns result from identifiable incompatibilities and interaction between dissidents and states. When we refer to dissidents, we generally mean individuals within the country that are outside of the government and

⁴ We integrate the data using Matching Event Data by Location, Time & Type (MELTT—Donnay et al. 2018), we discuss the integration in more detail in the Empirical Analysis section.

have preferences for changes in the status quo policy of the state. This can include the organized political opposition, but also individuals who are not participating in the election itself but may choose to mobilize against the government in the period around the elections. Dissidents are motivated to challenge states for a variety of reasons, including economic, political, or cultural grievances. In deciding whether and how to challenge states, dissidents have a wide menu of options. They can use violent means (for example, insurgency or terrorism), nonviolent means (such as protests, demonstrations, strikes or electoral boycotts), conventional political participation (for example, petitioning, forming a political party, voting, running for office), or some combination of these means. Dissidents can also fail to mobilize or be deterred from mobilizing; collective grievances are much more common than collective political action.

We assume that incumbent governments would like to stay in power and that dissidents (including the political opposition) would like to take power or, if not, to shift the status quo toward their preferences. Both governments and dissidents seek to achieve these objectives at the lowest possible costs. Dissidents decide whether and how to challenge states—e.g. with violence, nonviolent resistance, or a mix of the two—and governments decide how to respond to them—e.g. with repression or concessions, or a mix of the two.

Drawing on a large literature on social movements, we argue that three primary factors affect dissident decisions about whether and how to challenge the state.⁵ First, the level of motivation for dissidents matters. While grievances may to some degree be ubiquitous, in certain contexts dissidents are particularly aggrieved, and this motivation can increase dissent.

⁵ The literature on social movement mobilization is huge, prominent examples include McAdam (1982), Tilly (1978) and Tarrow (1994).

Second, dissidents consider the resources they can mobilize. Both violent and nonviolent contention are tactics that can help dissidents achieve their goals, and they do so in similar ways. Both are designed to impose costs on the government such that the government concedes to dissident demands.⁶ The specific resources dissidents anticipate needing can vary across types of mobilization. Participation in nonviolent actions such as protests, strikes, or sit-ins does not necessarily require specific skills. However, nonviolence is generally seen as needing large-scale participation to effectively pressure states (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011; DeNardo 1985; Dahl et al. 2017). In addition, nonviolent action is often more effective if it takes place in broad view of the public. All of these can help explain why it is more frequently used in urban environments and more developed parts of the country, where the resources are more conducive to nonviolent mobilization.⁷ Organized dissident-led violence, on the other hand, generally does require specialized skills and an ability to evade detection and capture by the state. As such, dissidents may view violence as more viable if they have a smaller set of individuals with military skills and an ability to operate outside of the state's coercive capacity. A growing literature has examined the conditions under which dissidents use violence and nonviolence⁸ and found that characteristics of dissidents

⁶ Violence can be also used to build coalitions of support. These mobilization efforts frequently take the form of ethnic violence, as has happened with inter-ethnic riots in India around elections (Wilkinson 2004).

⁷ Cunningham (2018) argues and shows, however, that smaller-scale nonviolence is frequently used in self-determination disputes and can lead to government concessions. Even in these cases, the resource needs for individuals to participate in nonviolent vs. violent action are different.

⁸ See, for example, Cunningham et al. (2017), Cunningham, Dahl & Frugé (2017), Pearlman (2011), Asal et al. (2013), and Cunningham (2013).

that relate to their ability to mobilize support or operate outside of the state's reach influence the choice to use violence or nonviolence.

The third factor affecting dissident decision-making, and the one we focus on in this article, is the political opportunity structure facing them. The political opportunity structure refers, broadly, to those factors external to social movements that affect their ability to mobilize, the form that mobilization takes, and the outcome of that mobilization. Dissidents operating in different contexts with a similar level of motivation and resource mobilization capacity may make different decisions whether and how to challenge their governments because of how conducive they see the political opportunity structure being to certain forms of contention. The political opportunity structure can vary across contexts and over time within the same context. Many elements can enter into the political opportunity structure, including factors within the targeted regime (such as elite divisions) and those that come from outside the country.⁹

A range of dynamics specific to elections can affect elements of this theoretical framework, in particular dissidents' motivation to challenge states and the political opportunity structure they perceive. A key factor affecting the motivation for dissidents to engage in contention around elections specifically is dissatisfaction with the outcome of the election, such as if the incumbent wins.¹⁰ This motivation is likely to be particularly strong when the election is not contested fairly (or

⁹ See Schock (1999) for a good discussion of the various elements of the political opportunity structure and an application to two cases.

¹⁰ Collier (2009) argues that post-election violence is often committed by "sore losers," particularly in settings in which democracy is less institutionalized; Beaulieu (2014) argues that electoral protests arise when incumbents and opposition elites are unable to negotiate acceptable terms of electoral conduct.

dissidents view the conduct as unfair).¹¹ Other factors related to the election can increase the motivation for dissent as well, such as the type of electoral system (Fjelde & Höglund 2016), the country's economic performance (Collier 2009; Brancati 2017) and the ethnic make-up of the society (Cederman, Gleditsch & Hug 2013; Butcher & Goldsmith 2016).

Another key factor affecting dissident-led contention (both in general, and specifically around elections) is state repression. The literature on the relationship between repression and dissent is huge and shows that the relationship between the two is complicated, endogenous, and not linear.¹² In some contexts, repression decreases dissent, but in others it increases it. Thinking about contention as arising from motivation, resources, and the political opportunity structure dissidents face can help to understand these differential effects. When dissidents contemplating challenging the state expect repression in response to dissent, this raises the costs they anticipate bearing (a factor in their political opportunity structure), and so can lead them not to engage the state. Thus, the anticipation of repression can deter dissent. However, repression itself is visible, and coverage of repression can increase dissident motivation. Ritter and Conrad (2016) formally examine these different effects of repression and argue that preventive repression decreases dissent, but that when this preventive repression fails and states respond to dissent with repression, it can lead to escalation.

The example of Syria before and during the “Arab Spring” can help to illustrate these dynamics. Syria had a highly repressive autocratic government dominated by a minority ethnic group (the Alawi) and had experienced years of economic stagnation prior to 2011. However, after the

¹¹ Daxecker (2012); and Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2013) find that post-electoral violence is greater when the election is fraudulent.

¹² See, for example, Davenport (2007), Young (2012) and Ritter and Conrad (2016).

brutal suppression of the 1978-1982 civil war, the country experienced little dissent for nearly three decades, in large part because the state was sufficiently repressive to deter anti-regime mobilization. However, the removal of autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt changed dissidents' calculations in Syria (and around the region) about whether they could successfully challenge their governments. Syrians took to the street in protest and the government responded with a brutal crackdown. Rather than ending the protests, this repression resulted in larger protests that spread throughout the country, the formation of armed groups, and eventually the country descended into full-scale civil war.

To reiterate, our theoretical framework views dissidents as more likely to challenge governments when they have grievances, resources conducive to mobilization, and see a political opportunity structure as favorable to mobilization. Prominent literatures have identified characteristics of countries, the dissidents themselves, and elections specifically that affect the different elements of this framework. However, dissidents make these decisions in a context in which international actors frequently play a large role. In the next section, we examine how international influences can affect this framework generally, and then focus on two specific types of actors—powerful democratic states with ties to the government and HSIPOs. In our discussion, we focus primarily on how these international actors affect the political opportunity structure facing dissidents.

International Influences on Dissident Strategic Choice

Civil wars, low-intensity violent conflicts, protest campaigns, and small scale nonviolent action are typically organized over domestic issues. Elections, likewise, generally focus on domestic political concerns such as economic issues, and foreign policy may play a limited role in party platforms or voters' choices. However, since the end of the Cold War, international actors

frequently have a significant presence in developing countries and play a particularly large role around elections in developing democracies. Governments, IOs, and non-governmental organizations put pressure on countries to hold elections and provide technical assistance for actually doing so.¹³ In addition, international election monitors deploy around countries on election day and monitor compliance with election laws.

This heavy international presence means that dissidents consider the potential international response to dissent when deciding whether and how to challenge states. In the specific contexts of elections, a body of literature has examined how international actors that seek to oversee the conduct of the election—particularly election monitors—affect dissent. These studies have come to somewhat mixed results. Daxecker (2012) finds that the presence of international election observers in combination with electoral fraud leads to increased post-electoral contention.¹⁴ Smidt (2016) finds that election observers only increase government-sponsored violence after fraudulent elections. Tucker (2017) find a positive effect of election observers on non-violent mass mobilization.

International actors seeking to improve the quality of elections, such as election monitors, have important effects on electoral violence and protest. In this article, we are interested in international influences on dissident strategic choice more generally and focus on international actors that are not present in the country specifically for the election but that we anticipate as influencing the interaction between states and dissidents. In particular, we focus on powerful democratic states with close ties to the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental

¹³ von Borzyskowski (2016) evaluates why some countries accept technical election assistance and others do not.

¹⁴ In her study, Daxecker (2012) does not differentiate between violent and nonviolent events nor between state and dissident-led contention.

Organizations. We focus on these actors because they are present in many developing countries and we expect theoretically for them to be in a position to have substantial influence on both governments and dissidents.

Powerful democratic external supporters of the government

Governments in developing countries are frequently weak, so they often form close ties to more powerful states. Lake (2009) argues that leaders of weak states enter into hierarchical relationships with more powerful states in which they give up some autonomy in return for protection from threats. Lake focuses primarily on protection from external threats, but Cunningham (2016) extends this argument and argues that these leaders enter into these relationships to find protection from internal threats as well.

There are a number of powerful states that form these types of relationships. The United States is the most powerful state in the international system, and has hierarchical relationships with many states, particularly in Latin America, the Middle East, and East Asia. Many developing countries have close ties to their former colonial power, particularly former French (and British) colonies in Africa. Russia has close ties to several former Soviet states and is building relationships in areas such as Central Asia and the Middle East.

The exact relationship between each external state and each government will vary, but we argue that there will be clear patterns, particularly in the relationship between powerful democratic states (such as the United States, United Kingdom and France) and developing democracies. We expect powerful democracies with close ties to the government to have a preference for these states to hold elections, for the election to be conducted freely and fairly and also for the country to be stable. These preferences will drive powerful democratic states' behavior with respect to the country and the election, and expectations of this behavior will affect dissident strategic choice. Specifically,

we expect the presence of powerful democracies supporting the government to affect dissidents' motivation and political opportunity structure.

As discussed above, dissidents' motivation to challenge the government can arise from various grievances including exclusion from power, unemployment, and cultural discrimination, among others. In the contexts of elections, specifically, motivation can also be a function of the behavior of the government, including fraud and repression. Powerful democratic states that have close ties to the government can put pressure on the government to conduct the election fairly and to restrain from repression. In so doing, they can reduce the motivation for dissidents to challenge the government, leading to less electoral contention.

The effect of close ties between powerful democratic states and the government on dissidents' political opportunity structure is more complicated. Because these states are powerful, and they have close ties to the government, dissidents have to consider the potential for these states to provide support to or even intervene militarily in the event that a civil war were to happen.¹⁵ Cunningham (2016) argues that the presence of powerful supporters of the government can lead dissidents to see no credible threat to rebelling and finds that states in more hierarchical relationships with the United States are less likely to have civil wars. Another potential example of this dynamic can be seen in former French colonies in Africa. Since de-colonization, France has had a closer relationship to its former colonies in Africa than other colonial powers including the United Kingdom. In several cases, France has intervened to support governments it was allied with,

¹⁵ Dissidents could also, potentially, anticipate international involvement in response to a mass protest campaign, although we think that this support is much less likely than in the case of a violent challenge. Additionally, we would expect that external support to governments facing a nonviolent challenge would be more likely to be rhetorical, as opposed to military, in nature.

including repressing non-democratic governments in places such as Chad. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that former French colonies in Africa are less prone to civil war and Collier (2009) argues that this dynamic is driven by France's over the horizon security guarantees to protect governments in the event of a domestic challenge.

At the same time, however, because these states have close ties to the government, they may be in a better position to push leaders to accept the results of electoral defeat rather than to fully fight or to engage in heavy repression. While France has intervened to support governmental allies, in the political crisis around the 2010 election in Cote D'Ivoire it put direct pressure on the incumbent leader Laurent Gbagbo to accept electoral defeat, helping to resolve the political standoff and potentially prevent a full-scale civil war.

Given these different effects, we expect less violent mobilization around elections in countries when the government has close ties to a powerful democratic state. We expect this both because the powerful state will put pressure on the government to hold a free and fair election (decreasing dissidents' motivation) and because dissidents will anticipate the potential for the government to receive support in the event of a violent struggle, thus making the political opportunity structure for violent contention less favorable. These two effects together lead to our first empirical implication, we will test these different mechanisms in subsequent analyses in the empirical analysis section:

H1: Dissidents in countries where the government has close ties to a powerful democratic state will engage in lower levels of violent contention.

For nonviolence, we anticipate that some of these effects will cancel each other out. The decrease in dissidents' motivation should contribute to less contention overall. However, because

powerful states may be in a position to pressure the government, dissidents may see an advantage to challenging the government through nonviolence. In addition, because nonviolence and violence are to some degree substitutes, factors that increase the costs of violence should make nonviolence relatively more attractive. As such, we do not have a prediction about the effect of ties between the government and powerful democratic states and nonviolent contention.¹⁶

Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations

As described above, governments in developing countries are frequently weak, which may lead them to form close ties with powerful states to try to enhance their security. Another effect of this weakness is that these governments often find themselves highly dependent on inter-governmental organizations to fill holes in budgets and fund development and humanitarian aid projects. Dependence on these organizations can give the organizations leverage over governments, and potentially puts these actors into a position to influence the state-dissident interaction.

Existing scholarship shows that a set of these actors—what Karreth & Tir (2012) and Tir & Karreth (2018) term Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations (HSIGOs)—have a direct influence on whether low-intensity conflicts escalate to civil war. HSIGOs are international agencies

¹⁶ Cunningham (2016) argues and finds that states in more hierarchical relationships with the United States are less prone to civil war (which is consistent with our expectation here) but more likely to experience nonviolent campaign (which is different from the prediction here). He argues that this dynamic is driven by these governments being more repressive because they are free from the threat of violent rebellion. We agree with this general argument, but in the case of elections specifically we anticipate powerful external democracies (including the United States) to pressure states to conduct the election with less fraud and repression.

that have permanent staffs and resources and which are able to make decisions independent of particular member states. Tir & Karreth argue that while HSIPOs—such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—often do not have a mandate specifically related to conflict management, they have preferences for domestic stability because conflict makes it extremely difficult for them to carry out their objectives (such as development projects). In addition, they argue that the substantial resources these actors have give them leverage over both governments and rebels and their autonomy of decision-making mean that they can operate largely free of political concerns. All of this means that HSIPOs can pressure governments and rebels to compromise, rather than to escalate, in low-intensity violent conflicts, and the long-term role of these actors in societies mean they can help actors overcome commitment problems as well. Tir and Karreth (2018) show that low-intensity violent conflicts in states where governments are members in a greater number of HSIPOs are less likely to escalate to civil wars.

In cases where violent conflict is not currently occurring but elections mean that dissidents are mobilized and contemplating whether and how to challenge governments, we argue that HSIPOs will play a bit of a different role. When governments are members of large numbers of HSIPOs, dissidents can anticipate that these actors will pressure governments to concede to some dissident demands in the face of contention. So, they represent a potential audience for dissidents and can mean that dissidents see the political opportunity structure for contention as more favorable. This increases the incentives for dissidents to mobilize and mount initial challenges against the government.

As examples of the role that HSIPOs can play, consider the case of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in recent contentious elections in Western Africa. In the 2010/2011 political crisis in Cote D'Ivoire ECOWAS (alongside France as described above) pressured Gbagbo to concede the election and end the stalemate by threatening sanctions and even

military intervention if he did not do so. The involvement of ECOWAS helped to prevent a full-scale civil war. In The Gambia, ECOWAS did intervene militarily in 2017 after incumbent president Yahya Jammeh refused to step down following electoral defeat, helping to diffuse a political crisis. Other actors, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, can play similar roles in contentious periods as well. Tir & Karreth (2018) argue that both were instrumental in convincing the Indonesian government to allow an independent referendum in East Timor to go ahead and in constraining the government's behavior, preventing a civil war and resulting in independence for East Timor.

Thus, we expect that, when the government is a member of a greater number of HSIPOs, dissidents will anticipate greater pressure being placed on the government to accommodate dissidents in response to contention. As such, we expect dissidents to engage in more contention following elections where HSIPOs are present. While HSIPOs have a general preference for dissidents to use nonviolence, we would also expect their presence to lead to greater violent contention as well, as violent conflict can generate greater visibility and governments constrained by HSIPOs may anticipate significant costs for repressing that violence.¹⁷

¹⁷ Karreth, Strayhorn & Tir (2014) argue that, when governments are constrained by the presence of a large number of HSIPOs, dissidents can make greater demands and push governments harder for concessions. They expect that this dynamic will mean that dissidents engage in more low-level violence in these contexts and find support for this expectation in 12 countries in the Middle East/North Africa. Our argument related to the effect of HSIPOs on dissident contention around elections is consistent with theirs.

H2: Dissidents in countries where the government is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs will engage in higher levels of violent contention.

H2a: Dissidents in countries where the government is a member of a greater number of HSIGOs will engage in higher levels of nonviolent contention.

Research Design

As stated above, while our theory is not specific to elections, we use elections as a lens through which to focus our analysis. Elections represent a time of potentially heightened contention and represent an opportunity to capture the observable implications of our hypotheses in cases with the potential for violent and nonviolent contention but variation in whether contention occurs. We test our hypotheses using data from all executive and legislative elections that took place in Africa from 2000-2012. Our election cases are drawn from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset, version 4.¹⁸ While our theoretical argument could apply to unconsolidated democracies in other regions of the world, we focus our analysis on Africa for two main reasons. First, developing democracies in Africa make up a sample of cases with significant variation in degree and form of contention. As highlighted above, dissidents in these democracies may turn to violent means, nonviolent means, both, or neither. Other regions do not witness this same degree of variation in the form contention takes. Second, Africa presents an opportunity to test our theory using highly disaggregated data from multiple data sources, allowing for the construction of a measure that captures both violent and nonviolent activity.

¹⁸ Hyde & Marinov (2012). For our analysis, legislative and executive elections that take place on the same day are collapsed into one observation. Additionally, in the case that two elections in the same country take place within three months of one another, the later one is dropped to avoid ambiguity over which election contentious events are associated with.

Dependent Variables

Our dependent variables are counts of either nonviolent or violent events in a number of time periods surrounding each election. We test our theory using the month following the election, as well as the three months before and after. In order to determine the number of violent and nonviolent events that occur in each of these time periods, we use the methodology Matching Event Data by Location, Time, and Type (MELTT)¹⁹ to integrate events from four events datasets—the Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED)²⁰, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)²¹, the Uppsala Conflict Data Project-Georeferenced Event Data (UCDP-GED)²² and the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD).²³ MELTT uses an automated protocol to match events from different events datasets that have overlapping spatiotemporal coverage but with the potential for differences in the way specific events are measured (including the label, time stamp, and geolocation). The protocol utilizes user-inputted information about the way that the datasets generally match up in terms of event types and actors to generate new data which identifies which events are duplicate entries contained in multiple datasets and which are unique events.

We draw on these four datasets because they cover a wide variety of types of violent and nonviolent events and they all cover this period in Africa. In addition, previous research using

¹⁹ Donnay et al. (2018).

²⁰ Raleigh et al. (2010).

²¹ START (2017).

²² Sundberg & Melander (2013).

²³ Salehyan et al. (2012).

MELTT has suggested that there is a substantial amount of missingness in each dataset.²⁴ Integrating from these four datasets, as opposed to just using one of them, gives us a clearer picture of the level and type of contention surrounding each of these elections.

We classify events as nonviolent or violent. Nonviolent events include those described as limited strikes, general strikes, spontaneous demonstrations, organized demonstrations, and protests. Violent events include those described as anti-government violence, battles, hijackings, non-state conflict, organized violent riots, remote violence, and spontaneous violent riots. We use this classification scheme to generate a count of the number of violent and nonviolent events that occur in the months around the election. Before aggregating the number of events in each election period, we subset the integrated data to only include events that involve non-state actors, since their actions are the ones our theory seeks to explain. The Appendix provides more detail on the data integration.

Figures 1 and 2 below present histograms showing the distributions of our two dependent variables. Both figures reveal that the vast majority of elections in Africa are not followed by dissident-led violent or nonviolent activity, rendering the question of what drives contention in those that are even more intriguing. The means for violence and nonviolence are seven and four events respectively, with the maximum number of violent events being 202 and the maximum of nonviolent events being 158. These numbers were both recorded following the Kenya 2007 election. We run robustness checks that drop outliers above the 99th percentile of our sample for both violence and nonviolence. These models can be found in Table A1 in the appendix.

²⁴ Donnay et al. (2018).

Figure 1. Violent Events in the Month Following Election




Figure 2. Nonviolent Events in the Month Following Election





Figure 3 below illustrates the variation in our dependent variables across both time and space. The histograms depict the number of events in the three months before and after the

election, by week. The four different elections shown are characterized by varying levels of violence and nonviolence, with Kenya 2007 associated with high levels of both violence and nonviolence, Zimbabwe 2002 with high levels of violence and low levels of nonviolence, Egypt 2012 with higher levels of nonviolence than violence, and finally Niger 2009 with low levels of all forms of contention.

Figure 3. Levels of Violence and Nonviolence Surrounding Four Elections



Independent Variables

Our independent variables of interest are drawn from several different sources. Hypothesis one refers to the relationship between powerful democratic states and the country’s government.

While a number of powerful external supporters could potentially affect contentious outcomes, we choose to focus on the support of the United States and France. Both states are interesting cases, as their pro-democracy rhetoric is often juxtaposed with alliances with autocratic leaders. For instance, France has claimed democracy promotion as a key aspect of French foreign policy, yet has also given aid designed to keep pro-French elites in power. Cameroon's first multi-party election in 1992 was defined by nearly a tripling in French aid designed to ensure President Paul Biya's victory, protecting French interests against popular Anglophone opposition candidate John Fru Ndi.²⁵ While the United States has less of a history than France of direct intervention in Africa, it is the most powerful state in the international system and its geostrategic interests often drive decisions of whether or not to impose sanctions on autocratic leaders. The power and influence of the United States means that it can have a substantial influence on dissident and government decision-making.²⁶ As an example, U.S. decisions whether or not to intervene in the Arab Spring had a substantial effect on state and dissident decision making, including in cases where the United States did not intervene to support government allies (such as Egypt) or to support dissidents in states historically opposed to it (such as Syria).

We use measures of United States economic and military assistance in a given year in order to proxy the closeness of the U.S. to the government in question. These data come from the US Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook).²⁷ Since the distribution of this variable is highly skewed, we log-transform the dollar amount of aid. To measure the potential for French support, we create a

²⁵ Schraeder (2000).

²⁶ Cunningham (2016) shows that states with a closer relationship to the United States are less likely to have civil war and have higher levels of government repression.

²⁷ U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations (2014).

measure of whether or not the country was a French colony.²⁸ If a country had multiple colonial legacies, it was coded as being the colony of the most recent colonizer.

Hypotheses 2 and 2a refer to the effect of inter-governmental organizations, in particular those that Johannes Karreth & Jaroslav Tir refer to as HSIPOs.²⁹ They identify 46 HSIPOs, which they define as “IGOs that are designed in such a way that they can generally operate without requiring consent from member states for each organizational decision. Often, they also possess policy, material, and/or economic resources that provide them with tangible leverage over member states” (2018, p. 42). To construct this measure, we follow their method and the variable is a count of the number of HSIPOs that a country is a member of a given year, based on the Correlates of War IGO data.³⁰

Control Variables

We include a number of additional variables, some of which control for election-related factors, and others that control for more general country-level characteristics. We include two measures of election fraud, one in models for pre-election contention and the other in models of

²⁸ We do not examine other colonial powers here because France has maintained the closest relationship with its former colonies in Africa in the post-colonial period and has also been the most willing to intervene militarily in the affairs of its former colonies.

²⁹ Karreth & Tir (2013). Data only extends to 2000 in Karreth & Tir’s article, so we follow their procedure to bring the data up to 2005. Because the data used to construct the measure (COW’s IGO data) only extends to 2005, values up to 2012 are iterated from the 2005 value. This strategy is justifiable because the number of HSIPOs in each country does not vary much over time.

³⁰ Pevehouse, Nordstrom & Warnke (2004).

post-election contention. The first is taken from NELDA's variable, "Before elections, are there significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair?". The second is based on Human Rights reports from the US State Department, a variable that allows us to cover more elections than if we use NELDA's measure of whether "reports critical of the government's handling of the election reached large numbers of people?". For elections monitored by international observers, the US State Department typically relies on international monitors' reports to form a judgment. Most of these reports are clear in whether there was thought to be serious fraud or not. However in cases that were somewhere in the middle, characterized by statements such as "minor irregularities", elections took a value of zero, indicating no serious fraud.³¹ We also include an indicator from NELDA of whether the opposition leaders were prevented from running (NELDA 13), and whether there were international monitors present (NELDA 45).³² Prevention from running may affect both the international attention devoted to the election, as well as the strategies dissidents choose to pursue. The presence of international observers has been shown to increase incentives for dissidents to use violence when the government commits serious fraud.³³ Finally, in the post-election contention models, we include a control for whether there was "significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election?", as the use of violence against civilians by the government may increase the likelihood of dissidents engaging in either nonviolent or violent behavior.

³¹ Daxecker (2012) collected this data for elections that took place before 2010. We collected the data for the remaining elections up through 2012 following her method.

³² Hyde and Marinov (2012).

³³ Daxecker (2012).

We control for other characteristics that do not directly stem from the election, but may have an impact on contention. We include a measure of state repression that incorporates a number of indicators, including the CIRI physical integrity rights index³⁴ and the Political Terror Scale (PTS)³⁵, since government repression may also affect both our explanatory and outcome variables. Since this variable is meant to control for more general trends of repression, we lag it by one year to ensure that it is not picking up election-year violence against civilians. We include a measure of the number of years since the country was involved in an armed conflict³⁶ due to the tendency for elections that take place with closer temporal proximity to the end of conflict to be more contentious. When the country is currently involved in a civil war, this measure takes a value of zero.³⁷ We include measures of population and GDP per capita.³⁸ The size of the population may be related to the number of contentious events, and economic development is widely viewed as a key explanatory factor of political violence. These two variables are from Kristian Gleditsch's expanded Population and GDP data.³⁹ We additionally include a control for the country's polity score, since

³⁴ Cingranelli and Richards (2010b).

³⁵ Repression measure from Fariss (2014). PTS data from Gibney et al. (2016).

³⁶ Based on UCDP armed conflict termination dates (Kreutz 2010).

³⁷ We include a robustness check in the appendix that drops all observations that take place in the context of civil war.

³⁸ GDP per capita is in current prices. Both population and GDP per capita are log transformed due to skewedness.

³⁹ From Gleditsch (2002). Because Gleditsch's data for GDP per capita only goes up to 2011, we extend it to 2012 using the observation from the previous year. Data is available at <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html>.

more consolidated democracies are less likely to experience violent contention, as are consolidated autocracies.⁴⁰ To address potential reporting biases in the number of reported contentious events, we control for the amount of news coverage by country. To construct this measure, we use Factiva to count the number of news articles in the two months surrounding the election written by a news agency inside the country.⁴¹ Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables of interest.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Main Models

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Violence (3 Months Prior)	169	16.172	43.569	0	405
Nonviolence (3 Months Prior)	169	8.231	16.979	0	116
Violence (1 Month Post)	169	7.136	22.760	0	202
Nonviolence (1 Month Post)	169	4.325	14.153	0	158
Violence (3 Months Post)	169	18.201	53.116	0	353
Nonviolence (3 Months Post)	169	11.266	32.727	0	259
US Economic Aid	169	17.238	2.308	9.626	20.724
US Military Aid	169	12.026	5.283	0	21.31
French Colony	169	0.437	0.497	0	1
HSIGOs	169	16.649	1.890	12	20
Serious Fraud	169	0.314	0.465	0	1
Violence Against Civilians	168	0.280	0.450	0	1
News Coverage	169	26.130	113.768	0	845
Last Conflict	169	16.990	17.303	0	66
Opposition Prevented	169	0.118	0.323	0	1
GDP	169	7.445	0.908	5.587	10.015
Population	169	9.157	1.342	6.317	11.998
Repression	169	0.054	0.817	-2.586	1.482
Polity 2 Score	169	1.402	4.937	-9	10
International Observers	166	0.886	0.319	0	1
Concerns of Fraud	169	0.533	0.500	0	1

⁴⁰ Reynal-Querol (2002); Regan & Bell (2010).

⁴¹ To be included in the count, the news article must be about the country in question, indicated by the presence of the country's name in the news article's headline. For a robustness check, we use a second measure of media coverage, counting the number of New York Times articles about the country in the two months surrounding the election, which does not change the results.

Statistical Results

We use a negative binomial model to estimate the relationship between the variables of interest and the amount of contentious activity following each election. A count model is the appropriate statistical technique since our outcome variable is the number of violent or nonviolent events in the month following the election and the negative binomial model in particular is appropriate because the data are over-dispersed. We cluster the standard errors on the country to account for the expectation of some degree of homogeneity between elections within the same country.

Table 2. The Effect of International Factors on Contention Surrounding Elections

Variables	3 Months Pre-Election		1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	0.172* (0.097)	0.126 (0.081)	0.005 (0.117)	0.059 (0.158)	0.114 (0.089)	0.221 (0.139)
US Military Aid	-0.059** (0.030)	0.027 (0.023)	-0.098*** (0.033)	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.128*** (0.034)	-0.022 (0.025)
French Colony	-1.219*** (0.388)	-0.389 (0.323)	-0.933*** (0.268)	0.172 (0.485)	-0.659*** (0.234)	0.559 (0.434)
HSIGOs	0.422*** (0.116)	0.180** (0.085)	0.428*** (0.087)	0.352*** (0.103)	0.481*** (0.079)	0.341*** (0.089)
Serious Fraud			0.275 (0.350)	0.694** (0.305)	0.166 (0.298)	0.629* (0.343)
Violence Against Civilians			0.988*** (0.280)	0.877** (0.394)	0.877** (0.279)	0.705 (0.473)
News Coverage	-0.002* (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.002)
Last Conflict	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.006)	0.016** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)	0.012* (0.007)
Opposition Prevented	0.317 (0.354)	0.457 (0.373)	0.379 (0.335)	0.211 (0.396)	0.258 (0.243)	-0.418 (0.442)
GDP	0.153 (0.192)	0.138 (0.156)	-0.231 (0.192)	-0.303 (0.260)	-0.040 (0.164)	-0.187 (0.211)
Population	0.029 (0.197)	0.037 (0.174)	0.087 (0.153)	0.240 (0.255)	0.024 (0.150)	0.217 (0.259)
General Repression	-0.932*** (0.211)	-0.462** (0.206)	-0.720*** (0.263)	-0.003 (0.318)	-1.236*** (0.175)	-0.182 (0.322)
Polity 2 Score	0.020 (0.037)	0.008 (0.030)	0.024 (0.035)	0.079* (0.041)	0.073** (0.034)	0.067* (0.040)
Observers Present			0.440 (0.497)	0.374 (0.713)	-0.432 (0.411)	0.090 (0.605)
Concerns of Fraud	0.779*** (0.272)	-0.086 (0.253)				
Constant	-9.245*** (2.848)	-5.171*** (1.939)	-4.532** (2.262)	-7.684** (3.010)	-6.153*** (2.070)	-9.589*** (2.601)
Observations	160	160	157	157	157	157

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2 presents the results of six models. The first two use the three-month time frame before elections to measure contention, the second two use the month after the election to measure contention, and the last two extend the post-election time frame to three months.

These models provide support for Hypothesis 1, which predicts that dissidents in countries where the government has close ties to a powerful democratic state will engage in lower levels of violent contention. Indeed, across the different time frames tested by our models, and controlling for a whole host of other variables, dissidents appear less likely to use violent contention in countries that receive higher amounts of US Military Aid as well as countries that have a French colonial history. Interestingly, US economic aid has a positive but largely insignificant effect on the amount of violence following an election. One explanation for this relationship may be the tendency for US economic aid to be used for development and humanitarian aid, potentially boosting dissidents' ability to organize if the aid reaches local populations.⁴²

The models also provide support for Hypotheses 2 and 2a, which predict that dissidents in countries where the government is a member of a greater number of HSIPOs will engage in higher levels of both violent and nonviolent contention. This relationship is again robust across the different time frames presented by the models. This suggests support for our argument that dissidents anticipate that the presence of a large number of HSIPOs means that contention can lead to increased pressure on governments to not repress dissidents and to concede to their demands.⁴³

⁴² This argument is consistent with that of Grossman (1992). In separate, unreported tests, we find that the effect of U.S. military aid and the effect of U.S. economic aid on violence remain robust when they are tested in separate models.

⁴³ This finding is particularly interesting in combination with that of Karreth & Tir (2013) and Tir & Karreth (2018) that a greater presence of HSIPOs reduces the likelihood that low-intensity

Comparing the coefficients, HSI GOs appears to have a slightly stronger effect on violent contention compared to nonviolent contention, although the difference is unlikely to be statistically significant.

The control variables included in the models generally perform as expected although some interesting patterns emerge. The measure of years since last conflict indicates that as time between the last conflict and the election increases, there is more likely to be nonviolent contention and less likely to be violent contention, and is statistically significant across most models. This effect is likely driven by a dynamic whereby some violent events pick up organized violence in the context of armed conflict and these become less likely as the time since armed conflict increases.

The coefficient on the general repression score is consistently negative and significant across violent models, indicating that more repressive regimes are successful in curbing violence following contentious elections. It is also negative across the nonviolent contention models, although with a smaller coefficient and it is only statistically significant in Model 2. This is consistent with arguments about a “preventive” effect of repression, since this variable is not election-specific, but rather picks up the level of repression of the regime overall. However, the variable measuring whether the government used violence against civilians has a positive and statistically significant effect on violent contention (and a significant and positive effect on nonviolent contention in the month following the election). This suggests that, consistent with our argument, election-specific repression can lead to an increase in dissident-led contention, particularly violence. The effect of these two variables together shows the complex relationship between state repression and dissident violence.

intrastate conflicts escalate to full-scale civil wars. Because we are drawing on events data, we are primarily picking up more isolated incidents or actions in lower intensity conflicts here, and a greater presence of HSI GOs appears to make those incidents more likely, which is also consistent with the argument and evidence in Karreth, Strayhorn & Tir (2014).

The two different measures of fraud (the expectations of fraud before the election and reports of fraud after the election) show an interesting pattern with dissident-led contention. The measure (from NELDA) indicating concerns of fraud is positive and significant for pre-election violence, but insignificant (and negative) for pre-election nonviolence. The measure of reports of fraud has a positive and statistically significant association with nonviolent contention after the election and is positive (but insignificant) for violent contention. These patterns suggest that electoral fraud increases contention, a pattern consistent with our argument and established in the literature on electoral contention.⁴⁴ The differential effects of expectations and reports of fraud on forms of contention is beyond the scope of this study but suggests further analysis of this relationship is warranted.


The other two election-specific measures—whether the opposition was prevented from running and whether there were international election observers present—were both insignificant. The non-finding on election observers is interesting, although the large literature on the effect of election observers has revealed some inconsistent findings. Of the country-level measures, higher news coverage is significant and positive for post-electoral nonviolent contention and the Polity2 score is positive in all models, and significant for nonviolent contention in the one and three month period following the election and for violent contention in the three months following the election. Neither GDP per capita nor population reach statistical significance in any of the models.

We explore the substantive significance of our variables of interest, generating the predicted number of events for the one-month post-election time frame. We use the observed values approach (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013) to generate our predictions (illustrated in Figures 4-6). Comparing US military aid, French colonial history, and HSIPOs, the effect of HSIPOs is the

⁴⁴ See, for example, Daxecker (2012) and Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2013


strongest of the three. Predictions generated from the model suggest that countries that are members in a high number of HSIPOs experience about 22 more violent events in the month following the election than countries with a low number of HSIPOs. More specifically, countries with 12 HSIPOs (the minimum in our data) are predicted to experience one violent event in the month following the election, while that number jumps to 23 violent events in countries with 20 HSIPOs (the maximum in our data). This is a very large substantive effect. The substantive effect of HSIPOs on the number of nonviolent events is more modest, with one predicted nonviolent event at the low end of HSIPO presence, and 11 predicted nonviolent events at the high end.

Figure 4. The Predicted Number of Violent (Left) & Nonviolent (Right) Events




In terms of the substantive effect of U.S. military aid on the number of violent events, we find that an increase in U.S. military aid, from the minimum in our dataset (0) to the maximum (1.8 billion), results in a substantial suppression of violent contention—a decrease from 21 predicted violent events to three. This suppression points toward the tension between the U.S.’s interest in political stability and its avowed commitment to democratic norms. The U.S. has consistently backed authoritarian regimes like Egypt, giving non-state actors little hope of effectively demanding free and fair elections.

Figure 5. The Predicted Number of Violent Events



Relatedly, we explore the substantive effect of French colonial history on the number of violent events in the month following an election. A country without a French colonial history on average experiences 8 violent events in the month following an election, while a country with French colonial history on average only experiences 3 violent events. This is a smaller substantive difference than the other variables of interest, however, in the span of one month, still significant.

Figure 6. The Predicted Number of Violent Events




Direct and Indirect Effects

The results above suggest that U.S. military aid and French colonial history are significant suppressors of violence and that when governments are more constrained by HSIPOs there is more contention, both violent and nonviolent. The theoretical argument suggests two different causal pathways that could be affecting these relationships. Dissident choices whether and how to engage in contention following the election are affected by the government's use of fraud and repression in the lead up to and during the election, and international actors have the potential to affect both fraud and repression. As such, international actors can have an indirect effect on dissident strategic choice. At the same time, there can be a direct international effect, as dissidents make choices about contention based on their expectations of how external actors will respond to this contention.

To examine the degree to which the presence of powerful supporters of the government and HSIPOs are having an indirect or direct effect on dissident strategic choice, we run a series of causal mediation models.⁴⁵ First, we compare the direct effect of U.S. military aid on violence as well as the effect of French colonial history on violence with the effect of each mediated by fraud. The results, illustrated in Figure 7, provide evidence of the direct causal mechanism—the decrease in violence appears to be the direct result of governments' relationships with powerful allies. Fraud plays no mediating role.

⁴⁵ Imai et al. (2011).

Figure 7. Average Causal Mediation Effects (ACME) & Average Direct Mediation Effects (ADE) for the Effect of U.S. Military Aid & French Colonial History on Violence, Mediated by Fraud




The plots above depict the effects and 95% confidence intervals for the average causal mediation (ACME), the average direct effect (ADE), and the total effect. The solid points and lines represent ACME and ADE for the treatment group, and the dotted lines and empty points represent estimates for the control group. The fact that the treatment and control groups for the ADE appear almost identical indicates that the presence of fraud plays no role in mediating the effect of U.S. Military Aid or French colonial history on post-election violence.

Second, we run the same test with repression as the mediator, exploring the effect of U.S. military aid and French colonial history on violence mediated by repression. The comparison between the ADE and the ACME illustrated in Figure 8 mirrors the findings above—the direct effect is stronger than the mediated effect. Further, a comparison between the treated ADE and the control ADE below reveals that countries with attachments to France who use high levels of

repression witness slightly more violent contention than those with the same attachments who use low levels of repression.

Figure 8. Average Causal Mediation Effects (ACME) & Average Direct Mediation Effects (ADE) for the Effect of U.S. Military Aid & French Colonial History on Violence, Mediated by Repression




These mediation models suggest that the depressive effect of United States military aid and French colonial history on dissident-led violent contention before and after elections occurs because dissidents see a political opportunity structure which is less conducive to violent mobilization not because these powerful democratic states put pressure on governments to behave better, resulting in a lower motivation for rebellion. This effect is consistent with that identified in Cunningham (2016), who found a more general pattern where weaker states with close ties to the United States had a lower risk of civil war but higher rates of repression.

We also use mediation analysis to explore HSIPOs' positive effect on the use of violence and nonviolence. While our results demonstrate that a state's membership in a greater number of HSIPOs is significantly associated with higher levels of both forms of contention, there are several potential pathways through which this effect could happen. Our argument is that dissidents

anticipate that, when the government is constrained by membership in a greater number of HSIGOs, these actors will pressure it not to escalate conflicts and instead to settle with dissidents. This expectation leads dissidents to anticipate greater benefit from contention and so to challenge governments more readily. As such, we do not have an expectation of an indirect effect of HSIGOs, but test for one here to see if it appears that the effect of HSIGOs is mediated through repression.

Figure 9. Average Causal Mediation Effects (ACME) & Average Direct Mediation Effects (ADE) for the Effect of HSIGOs on Violence and Nonviolence, Mediated by Repression



The results of the mediation analysis presented in Figure 9 shows that, as with the previous mediation models, the direct effect of HSIGOs is much greater than the indirect effect, for both violent and nonviolent contention. This suggests that the effect of HSIGOs on contention comes from dissident expectations of their response to this contention (in terms of putting pressure on the government) as opposed to through some effect of HSIGOs on the government’s use of repression.

Further Analyses

We conduct a series of additional analyses to evaluate the robustness of the results in Table 2. We describe them briefly here and present tables in the Appendix. As we mentioned above, we run all of the main models with outliers dropped (Table A1) and our original findings remain robust. We also replace our measure that controls for fraud with NELDA's measure, which indicates whether "reports critical of the government's handling of the election reached large numbers of people" (Table A2). While this change results in a substantial number of observations being dropped due to missing data, our results remain the same.

We run a number of models that control for additional election-related variables. We control for whether elections are for an executive, since these elections may be more contentious than elections for legislators (Table A3). We also run our original models with a control for whether the vote count is a gain for the opposition (Table A4).⁴⁶ The last election-related control we add is whether the election results in a victory for the incumbent, assuming that there may be more dissident contention if the incumbent wins (Table A5). The results from the original models remain robust to all of these additional specifications.

We include models that drop all observations of countries that are involved in a civil war at the time of the election, since these countries are clearly more likely to experience violence (Table A6). The measure of civil war is based on the 25-battle death in a calendar year threshold from the UCDP/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson & Eck 2018). These models show a similar effect to that in Table 2 of US military aid and French

⁴⁶ NELDA 27 is used for this control variable.

colonial history suppressing violence in the periods before and after elections.⁴⁷ The effect of HSIPOs in increasing nonviolent contention remains as well, but while their effect on violent events remains positive it becomes insignificant. This is likely because we have excluded several of the more violent cases, those where HSIPOs may have previously contributed to an escalation to low intensity conflict.

Finally, we use zero-inflated models in place of the negative binomial models (Table A7). Roughly 50% of the observations in our data have 0 contentious events. This is true of both violent contention and nonviolent contention. While this number of zeroes is not overly concerning, we predict the zeroes using serious fraud (or concerns of serious fraud in the case of the pre-election period) and time since civil war, since these are the variables that are most likely to influence an absence of contention altogether. The effect of US military aid, French colonial history, and HSIPOs in the zero-inflated models are consistent with those in Table 2.

Conclusion

When dissidents decide to pick up arms or take to the streets, they do not make these decisions independently from the influences of international actors. Foreign states, IGOs, and other transnational entities all play a role in influencing the dynamics of contention at the domestic level.

In this article, we developed a theoretical framework for understanding why dissidents engage in violent and nonviolent activity and examined how international actors can influence these

⁴⁷ Interestingly, the models show a significant (at the 0.1 level) and negative effect of US military aid and a significant (at the 0.05 level) and positive effect of being a French colony on nonviolent contention in the three months following the election when civil wars are excluded. We do not see a theoretical explanation for this change.

decisions. We conducted a statistical analysis of the effect of powerful democratic supporters of the government and Highly Structured Inter-Governmental Organizations on dissident-led violent and nonviolent action around elections using integrated data drawn from leading conflict event datasets. These analyses show that dissidents are less likely to engage in violence when the government receives higher levels of US military aid or the country is a former French colony. We also find that countries with a greater number of HSIPOs experience both more violent and nonviolent dissident action around elections.

The argument and analysis in this article makes key contributions to our understanding of dissident strategic choice and of international influences on domestic conflict. First, they show that the presence of powerful international actors (such as the United States and France) can have a deterrent effect, suggesting to dissidents that challenging governments (particularly through violence) will be costly and unlikely to be successful. This deterrent effect is interesting when considered in relation to existing work that finds that external military intervention is generally associated with longer running conflicts. Recent civil wars such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq show that, even when powerful states back weak governments, insurgencies can continue. The analysis here suggesting a deterrent effect may help to shed additional light on this pattern. If powerful states deter dissidents' from taking up arms against their governments' in many cases, this could mean that there is a selection effect whereby the cases where dissidents do choose to rebel are systematically different from the cases where they do not, leading them to be longer and more resistant to termination.

The analysis in this article shows a second effect that external actors can play—they can provide an audience to dissidents. When dissidents with a motivation to challenge their government decide whether and how to do so, they consider how the government is likely to respond to them. If they anticipate international pressure being applied to governments to settle with dissidents, this

suggests that engaging in contention will be more beneficial. Indeed, our findings on HSIPOs in this article, combined with those of Tir and Karreth (2018) reveal an interesting pattern. When governments are members of a greater number of HSIPOs, we observe both higher levels of violence and nonviolent activity. Tir and Karreth (2018), however, find that low-intensity disputes in these states are less likely to escalate to civil war, suggesting support for the argument that dissidents are more likely to challenge governments that they expect to be conciliatory due to international pressure, and that this international pressure leads these governments to in fact reach compromise settlements with these dissidents.

The argument and analyses in this article suggest that further research on the effect of international influences on contention broadly is warranted. While powerful states and HSIPOs are key international actors, there are other actors that are likely to have influence as well—including regional states and non-governmental organizations. In addition, while elections are key times where political contention is possible and international actors pay attention, there are other contexts of intrastate disputes where these international influences could matter. Further research focused on a larger set of actors in a broader set of disputes could further enhance our academic understanding of dissident strategic choice and policymaker's understandings of how to work to prevent periods of contention from escalating to civil war.

Works Cited

- Asal, Victor; Richard Legault, Ora Szekely & Jonathan Wilkenfeld (2013) Gender ideologies and forms of contentious mobilization in the Middle East. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 305-318.
- Beaulieu, Emily (2014). *Electoral Protest and Democracy in the Developing World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brancati, Dawn (2016) *Democracy Protests*. Cambridge University Press.
- Butcher, Charles, and Benjamin E. Goldsmith (2016) Elections, Ethnicity, and Political Instability. *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, & Hug, Simon (2013) Elections and ethnic civil war. *Comparative Political Studies* 46(3): 387-417.
- Cetinyan, Rupen (2002). Ethnic bargaining in the shadow of third-party intervention. *International Organization* 56(3): 645-677.
- Chenoweth, Erica & Maria J Stephan (2011) *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (2010). The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights data project. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32(2), 401-424.
- Collier, P. (2009). War, Guns, and Votes. *Democracy in Dangerous Places*. London: The Bodley Head.
- Cunningham, David E. (2016). "Preventing Civil War: How the Potential for International Intervention can Deter Conflict Onset" *World Politics* 68(2): 307-340.
- Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch., Belen González. Dragana Vidović, & Peter B. White (2017). Words and deeds: From incompatibilities to outcomes in anti-government disputes. *Journal of Peace Research* 54(4): 468-483.

- Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher (2013) Understanding strategic choice: The determinants of civil war and non-violent campaigns in self-determination disputes. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3): 291-304.
- Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher; Marianne Dahl & Anne Frugé (2017). Strategies of Resistance: Diversification and Diffusion. *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3), 591-605.
- Dahl, Marianne; Scott Gates, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Belén González (2017) Accounting for numbers: Actor profiles and the choice of violent and non-violent tactics. Typescript, PRIO (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315784262_Accounting_for_Numbers_How_Group_Characteristics_Shape_the_Choice_of_Violent_and_Non-Violent_Tactics).
- Davenport, Christian (2007). State repression and political order. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 1-23.
- Daxecker, Ursula E. (2012) The cost of exposing cheating: International election monitoring, fraud, and post-election violence in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 49(4): 503-516.
- DeNardo, James (1985) *Power in Numbers: The Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Donnay, Karsten, Eric Dunford, Erin McGrath, David Backer and David E. Cunningham (2018). Integrating Conflict Events Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Forthcoming.
- Fariss, C. J. (2014). Respect for human rights has improved over time: Modeling the changing standard of accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2), 297-318.
- Fjelde, Hanne, & Kristine Höglund (2016) Electoral institutions and electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. *British Journal of Political Science*, 46(2): 297-320.
- Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, and Daniel Arnon (2016). The Political Terror Scale 1976-2015. Retrieved December 1, 2017, from the Political Terror Scale website: <http://www.politicalterror scale.org>.

- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2002). Expanded trade and GDP data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(5): 712-724.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. Armed conflict 1946-2001: A new dataset. *Journal of peace research* 39(5): 615-637.
- Grossman, H. I. (1992). Foreign aid and insurrection. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 3(4), 275-288.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Susan Hyde, and Ryan Jablonski (2014) When do Governments Resort to Election Violence? *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 149-179.
- Hanmer, Michael J., and Kerem Ozan Kalkan (2013). Behind the curve: Clarifying the best approach to calculating predicted probabilities and marginal effects from limited dependent variable models. *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 263-277.
- Harish, S.P. and Andrew T. Little (2017). The Political Violence Cycle. *American Political Science Review* 111(2): 237-55.
- Hyde, Susan D. and Nikolay Marinov (2012) "Which Elections can be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20(2): 191-210.
- Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto. (2011). Unpacking the black box of causality: Learning about causal mechanisms from experimental and observational studies. *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 765-789.
- Jenne, Erin (2004). A bargaining theory of minority demands: Explaining the dog that did not bite in 1990s Yugoslavia. *International Studies Quarterly* 48(4): 729-754.
- Karreth, Johannes & Jaroslav Tir (2012) International Institutions and Civil War Prevention. *The Journal of Politics* 75(1): 96-109.
- Karreth, Johannes, Joshua Strayhorn & Jaroslav Tir (2014). "Inviting rebellion? IGOs, minority groups, and low-level violence in intrastate conflicts." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Philadelphia, PA.

- Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2): 243-250.
- Lake, David A. (2009). *Hierarchy in international relations*. Cornell University Press.
- McAdam, Doug (1982) *Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.
- Pearlman, Wendy (2011) *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pettersson, Therése, and Kristine Eck (2018). Organized violence, 1989–2017. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(4): 535-547.
- Pevehouse, Jon C., Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke (2004). The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset Version 2.0. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21:101-119.
- Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen (2010). Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5) 651-660.
- Regan, P. M., & Bell, S. R. (2010). Changing lanes or stuck in the middle: Why are anocracies more prone to civil wars?. *Political Research Quarterly*, 63(4), 747-759.
- Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:29-54.
- Ritter, Emily Hencken, and Courtenay R. Conrad (2016). "Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational challenges of explaining strategic repression." *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 85-99.

- Salehyan, Idean, Cullen S. Hendrix, Jesse Hamner, Christina Case, Christopher Linebarger, Emily Stull, and Jennifer Williams (2012). Social conflict in Africa: A new database. *International Interactions* 38(4): 503-511.
- Schraeder, P. J. (2000). Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining US & French Competition in Francophone Africa. *Political science quarterly*, 115(3): 395-419.
- Schock, Kurt (1999). People power and political opportunities: Social movement mobilization and outcomes in the Philippines and Burma. *Social problems* 46(3): 355-375.
- Smidt, Hannah (2016) From a perpetrator's perspective: International election observers and post-electoral violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(2): 226-241.
- Sundberg, Ralph & Erik Melander (2013). Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523-532.
- Tarrow, Sidney (1994) *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thyne, Clayton L. (2009). *How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict: Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Tilly, Charles (1978) *From mobilization to revolution*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Tir, Jaroslav, and Johannes Karreth (2018). *Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tucker, Joshua A. (2007) Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3): 535-551.
- U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations. July 1, 1945 – September 30, 2014. USAID. <https://www.usaid.gov/open/greenbook/2014>.
- von Borzyskowski, Inken (2016). Resisting democracy assistance: Who seeks and receives technical election assistance? *The Review of International Organizations* 11(2): 247-282.

Wilkinson, Steven I. (2004) *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press.

Young, Joseph K. (2013). "Repression, dissent, and the onset of civil war." *Political Research Quarterly* 66(3): 516-532.

Appendix

The Data Integration Procedure

In this section we provide a more detailed description of the MELTT data integration protocol used in this article. Following the method used by Donnay et al. (2018), we assume that any two events recorded in two different datasets that occur within 3 kilometers and 1 day of each other could potentially be the same event. We then use the taxonomies outlined in Donnay et al. to determine whether the two events are a match. The taxonomies formalize how variable coding overlaps, moving from specific as possible to broader descriptions. For example, events coded as “Organized Demonstrations” in SCAD are categorized as a “Protest/Demonstration” at the lowest level of the taxonomy, but generalized to “Nonviolent Event” at the highest level.

Once the events have been integrated from the four datasets, we subset the data to only include non-state actors of interest. We do this by dropping primary actors that have any of the following words included in their actor description: military, government, army, navy, air force, United Nations, police, border guards, United States, security, presidential, peace mission, UN, EU. While it is likely that this list does not remove every state or inter-governmental organization, it removes the vast majority of actors who do not qualify as non-state actors of interest.

Table A1. Full Models with Outliers Dropped

Variables	3 Months Pre-Election		1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	0.135 (0.099)	0.121 (0.080)	-0.011 (0.114)	0.064 (0.153)	0.135 (0.087)	0.213 (0.136)
US Military Aid	-0.029 (0.032)	0.027 (0.023)	-0.072** (0.030)	-0.006 (0.025)	-0.108*** (0.033)	-0.020 (0.024)
French Colony	-1.207*** (0.392)	-0.393 (0.332)	-0.849*** (0.261)	0.194 (0.449)	-0.518** (0.208)	0.568 (0.428)
HSIGOs	0.406*** (0.115)	0.176** (0.090)	0.400*** (0.090)	0.252** (0.103)	0.438*** (0.073)	0.297*** (0.091)
Serious Fraud			0.095 (0.342)	0.561* (0.294)	0.044 (0.299)	0.575* (0.338)
Violence Against Civilians			0.812*** (0.262)	0.805** (0.351)	0.827*** (0.281)	0.633 (0.441)
News Coverage	-0.002* (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001* (0.001)	0.004* (0.002)
Last Conflict	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.006)	0.020** (0.008)	-0.024*** (0.008)	0.014* (0.008)
Opposition Prevented	0.442 (0.340)	0.408 (0.390)	0.539* (0.309)	-0.040 (0.376)	0.201 (0.236)	-0.575 (0.441)
GDP	0.123 (0.185)	0.127 (0.159)	-0.256 (0.180)	-0.193 (0.256)	-0.123 (0.143)	-0.149 (0.211)
Population	0.024 (0.193)	0.045 (0.174)	0.065 (0.150)	0.268 (0.248)	-0.012 (0.144)	0.232 (0.257)
General Repression	-0.956*** (0.197)	-0.447** (0.202)	-0.859*** (0.252)	-0.058 (0.294)	-1.034*** (0.223)	-0.201 (0.311)
Polity 2 Score	0.027 (0.036)	0.005 (0.031)	0.033 (0.033)	0.066 (0.043)	0.051 (0.031)	0.058 (0.041)
Observers Present			0.367 (0.468)	0.168 (0.631)	-0.170 (0.359)	-0.042 (0.586)
Concerns of Fraud	0.682*** (0.252)	-0.065 (0.254)				
Constant	-7.677*** (2.698)	-5.111*** (1.836)	-3.707* (2.242)	-6.977** (3.157)	-5.642*** (1.859)	-9.026*** (2.618)
Observations	158	158	155	155	155	155

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2. Full Models with NELDA Fraud Measure (NELDA 28)

Variables	1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	-0.057 (0.125)	0.088 (0.194)	0.049 (0.107)	0.204 (0.152)
US Military Aid	-0.141*** (0.037)	0.023 (0.041)	-0.176*** (0.039)	-0.031 (0.033)
French Colony	-0.766** (0.339)	0.093 (0.517)	-0.559** (0.272)	0.245 (0.422)
HSIGOs	0.439*** (0.092)	0.431*** (0.141)	0.417*** (0.071)	0.448*** (0.122)
Fraud (Nelda 28)	0.173 (0.343)	0.686* (0.417)	0.326 (0.294)	0.184 (0.396)
Violence Against Civilians	1.039*** (0.382)	0.924* (0.472)	0.909*** (0.339)	0.657 (0.512)
News Coverage	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Last Conflict	-0.039*** (0.007)	0.026** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.007)	0.014* (0.007)
Opposition Prevented	0.225 (0.419)	0.351 (0.480)	-0.009 (0.311)	-0.168 (0.483)
GDP	-0.239 (0.242)	-0.484 (0.341)	-0.214 (0.200)	-0.514** (0.257)
Population	0.218 (0.140)	-0.047 (0.248)	0.191 (0.136)	0.014 (0.240)
General Repression	-0.715** (0.325)	-0.453 (0.374)	-0.829*** (0.255)	-0.423 (0.414)
Polity 2 Score	0.062 (0.050)	0.043 (0.052)	0.068* (0.038)	0.031 (0.045)
Observers Present	0.848 (0.581)	0.221 (0.749)	0.141 (0.403)	-0.336 (0.641)
Constant	-4.629 (2.831)	-6.070* (3.512)	-4.485* (2.521)	-6.067** (2.707)
Observations	114	114	114	114

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Full Models with Controls for Election Type

VARIABLES	3 Months Pre-Election		1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	0.183*	0.131	0.003	0.055	0.108	0.199
	(0.105)	(0.087)	(0.124)	(0.159)	(0.091)	(0.142)
US Military Aid	-0.059*	0.026	-0.097***	-0.021	-0.110***	-0.027
	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.026)
French Colony	-1.231***	-0.373	-0.972***	0.184	-0.546**	0.569
	(0.399)	(0.335)	(0.264)	(0.487)	(0.213)	(0.436)
HSIGOs	0.427***	0.174*	0.409***	0.313***	0.432***	0.305***
	(0.130)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.106)	(0.075)	(0.098)
Presidential Election	0.114	0.088	0.268	0.521*	0.159	0.242
	(0.228)	(0.302)	(0.266)	(0.289)	(0.207)	(0.352)
Serious Fraud			0.244	0.756**	0.158	0.785**
			(0.347)	(0.317)	(0.287)	(0.366)
Violence Against Civilians			0.912***	0.859**	0.827***	0.770
			(0.291)	(0.379)	(0.286)	(0.482)
News Coverage	-0.002*	0.003	-0.000	0.004**	0.001*	0.005**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Last Conflict	-0.033***	-0.002	-0.035***	0.011	-0.025***	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Opposition Prevented	0.344	0.462	0.395	0.174	0.015	-0.483
	(0.343)	(0.367)	(0.323)	(0.418)	(0.241)	(0.479)
GDP	0.184	0.176	-0.185	-0.160	-0.100	-0.082
	(0.192)	(0.186)	(0.200)	(0.259)	(0.146)	(0.209)
Population	-0.010	0.023	0.129	0.343	0.057	0.317
	(0.209)	(0.201)	(0.169)	(0.271)	(0.157)	(0.285)
General Repression	-0.952***	-0.463*	-0.707***	0.142	-0.944***	-0.011
	(0.214)	(0.241)	(0.247)	(0.314)	(0.204)	(0.336)
Polity 2 Score	0.020	0.008	0.015	0.066	0.050	0.058
	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.043)
Observers Present			0.292	0.351	-0.208	0.139
			(0.537)	(0.690)	(0.377)	(0.620)
Concerns of Fraud	0.792***	-0.065				
	(0.281)	(0.267)				
Constant	-8.657***	-5.440***	-4.893**	-9.042***	-5.887***	-10.428***
	(2.717)	(1.988)	(2.289)	(2.990)	(1.830)	(2.389)
Observations	155	155	152	152	152	152

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4. Full Models with Controls for Opposition Gain⁴⁸

VARIABLES	1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	0.013 (0.120)	0.004 (0.159)	0.110 (0.085)	0.154 (0.133)
US Military Aid	-0.096*** (0.033)	-0.009 (0.026)	-0.112*** (0.034)	-0.039 (0.025)
French Colony	-0.933*** (0.284)	0.126 (0.454)	-0.594*** (0.220)	0.366 (0.352)
HSIGOs	0.421*** (0.092)	0.305*** (0.112)	0.434*** (0.070)	0.310*** (0.096)
Opposition Gain	-0.075 (0.254)	0.592** (0.262)	0.011 (0.206)	0.471* (0.268)
Serious Fraud	0.270 (0.351)	1.021*** (0.339)	0.185 (0.295)	1.065*** (0.361)
Violence Against Civilians	1.000*** (0.276)	0.723* (0.422)	0.821*** (0.275)	0.321 (0.429)
News Coverage	-0.000 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Last Conflict	-0.034*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)
Opposition Prevented	0.395 (0.345)	0.155 (0.393)	0.028 (0.256)	-0.416 (0.407)
GDP	-0.201 (0.196)	-0.324 (0.253)	-0.119 (0.149)	-0.282 (0.210)
Population	0.106 (0.171)	0.391 (0.262)	0.076 (0.150)	0.426* (0.247)
General Repression	-0.711*** (0.256)	0.162 (0.316)	-0.918*** (0.204)	0.103 (0.287)
Polity 2 Score	0.021 (0.037)	0.067 (0.042)	0.047 (0.033)	0.053 (0.038)
Observers Present	0.460 (0.502)	0.427 (0.663)	-0.155 (0.356)	-0.118 (0.557)
Constant	-4.961** (2.197)	-7.442*** (2.827)	-5.903*** (1.787)	-8.798*** (2.483)
Observations	149	149	149	149

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

⁴⁸ Using Nelda27: “Was the vote count a gain for the opposition?”, “If the election vote count displayed a gain from previous elections for the opposition (relative to the ruling party in the relevant branch of government), even if they did not win, ”yes” is coded. If there was no gain in the vote by the opposition, a ”no” is coded.”

Table A5. Full Models with Control for Incumbent Victory

VARIABLES	1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	-0.096 (0.115)	0.067 (0.177)	0.028 (0.090)	0.163 (0.158)
US Military Aid	-0.131*** (0.040)	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.152*** (0.042)	-0.072*** (0.026)
French Colony	-0.802** (0.349)	0.449 (0.575)	-0.500** (0.246)	0.344 (0.467)
HSIGOs	0.457*** (0.100)	0.310*** (0.114)	0.447*** (0.073)	0.326*** (0.099)
Incumbent Wins	0.108 (0.280)	-0.210 (0.465)	-0.188 (0.259)	0.163 (0.438)
Serious Fraud	0.248 (0.361)	1.000** (0.393)	0.131 (0.298)	1.061*** (0.393)
Violence Against Civilians	1.129*** (0.271)	0.844* (0.442)	0.922*** (0.270)	0.657 (0.443)
News Coverage	0.001 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Last Conflict	-0.039*** (0.006)	0.014 (0.010)	-0.030*** (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)
Opposition Prevented	0.079 (0.320)	0.138 (0.410)	-0.173 (0.254)	-0.487 (0.450)
GDP	-0.371* (0.197)	-0.338 (0.271)	-0.308** (0.149)	-0.329 (0.229)
Population	0.278 (0.181)	0.375 (0.290)	0.155 (0.164)	0.494* (0.254)
General Repression	-0.762** (0.300)	0.083 (0.343)	-0.982*** (0.213)	0.219 (0.272)
Polity 2 Score	0.023 (0.037)	0.082* (0.044)	0.058* (0.035)	0.058 (0.038)
Observers Present	0.865* (0.491)	0.605 (0.672)	0.107 (0.358)	-0.118 (0.625)
Constant	-4.137 (3.033)	-7.916** (3.179)	-3.586* (2.040)	-9.274*** (2.807)
Observations	131	131	131	131

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Full Models With Civil War Observations Dropped

VARIABLES	3 Months Pre-Election		1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	0.272** (0.110)	0.228** (0.091)	0.074 (0.194)	0.027 (0.181)	0.143 (0.103)	0.150 (0.159)
US Military Aid	-0.096*** (0.035)	0.025 (0.025)	-0.127*** (0.032)	-0.017 (0.031)	-0.140*** (0.035)	-0.050* (0.027)
French Colony	-1.934*** (0.483)	-0.282 (0.417)	-1.459*** (0.342)	0.664 (0.483)	-0.975*** (0.288)	1.004** (0.442)
HSIGOs	0.495*** (0.162)	0.181 (0.116)	0.496*** (0.131)	0.145 (0.208)	0.402*** (0.108)	0.168 (0.190)
Serious Fraud			0.077 (0.416)	0.420 (0.327)	-0.115 (0.346)	0.559 (0.371)
Violence Against Civilians			1.012*** (0.386)	0.991** (0.435)	1.006*** (0.341)	1.037** (0.500)
News Coverage	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.002** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Last Conflict	-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.030*** (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.016* (0.009)	0.015 (0.012)
Opposition Prevented	0.945* (0.536)	0.634 (0.481)	1.062* (0.596)	-0.132 (0.614)	0.196 (0.488)	-0.525 (0.651)
GDP	-0.067 (0.204)	0.151 (0.175)	-0.474** (0.210)	-0.060 (0.278)	-0.331** (0.143)	-0.002 (0.225)
Population	-0.039 (0.280)	-0.140 (0.235)	-0.100 (0.256)	0.305 (0.393)	-0.011 (0.230)	0.495 (0.400)
General Repression	-0.744* (0.416)	-0.722* (0.382)	-0.910* (0.475)	-0.470 (0.489)	-0.994** (0.426)	-0.242 (0.552)
Polity 2 Score	0.008 (0.039)	0.004 (0.038)	0.028 (0.043)	0.072 (0.049)	0.037 (0.035)	0.052 (0.039)
Observers Present			0.758 (0.837)	0.051 (0.703)	-0.253 (0.522)	0.188 (0.684)
Concerns of Fraud	0.888** (0.406)	-0.213 (0.341)				
Constant	-8.586** (3.376)	-5.268** (2.457)	-3.347 (3.157)	-5.976 (3.781)	-3.248 (2.248)	-9.507*** (3.190)
Observations	120	120	117	117	117	117

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7. Full Models Using Zero Inflated Negative Binomial⁴⁹

VARIABLES	3 Months Pre-Election		1 Month Post-Election		3 Months Post-Election	
	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34	Model 35	Model 36
	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention	Violent Contention	Nonviolent Contention
US Economic Aid	0.192*	0.141*	0.008	0.041	0.119	0.192
	(0.103)	(0.083)	(0.125)	(0.160)	(0.086)	(0.145)
US Military Aid	-0.061**	0.028	-0.096***	-0.013	-0.108***	-0.026
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.026)
French Colony	-1.211***	-0.373	-0.931***	0.179	-0.556***	0.572
	(0.406)	(0.333)	(0.265)	(0.475)	(0.204)	(0.428)
HSIGOs	0.434***	0.172*	0.434***	0.339***	0.443***	0.319***
	(0.127)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.105)	(0.073)	(0.094)
Serious Fraud			0.349	0.880***	0.229	0.833**
			(0.358)	(0.318)	(0.279)	(0.379)
Violence Against Civilians			0.935***	0.957**	0.852***	0.800*
			(0.278)	(0.392)	(0.279)	(0.477)
News Coverage	-0.002*	0.003	0.000	0.004***	0.001*	0.005**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Last Conflict	-0.030***	-0.002	-0.031***	0.013	-0.025***	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Opposition Prevented	0.358	0.510	0.376	0.154	0.039	-0.498
	(0.354)	(0.392)	(0.330)	(0.417)	(0.246)	(0.473)
GDP	0.154	0.166	-0.251	-0.293	-0.114	-0.161
	(0.192)	(0.164)	(0.190)	(0.261)	(0.147)	(0.213)
Population	-0.023	-0.003	0.102	0.313	0.049	0.306
	(0.212)	(0.179)	(0.174)	(0.259)	(0.155)	(0.277)
General Repression	-0.974***	-0.513**	-0.735***	0.137	-0.936***	-0.031
	(0.225)	(0.212)	(0.251)	(0.305)	(0.204)	(0.324)
Polity 2 Score	0.025	0.010	0.027	0.075*	0.050	0.063
	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.041)
Observers Present			0.408	0.458	-0.215	0.179
			(0.491)	(0.706)	(0.337)	(0.608)
Concerns of Fraud	0.790***	-0.053				
	(0.278)	(0.259)				
Constant	-8.558***	-5.264***	-4.716**	-7.966***	-6.025***	-9.784***
	(2.861)	(1.954)	(2.242)	(3.022)	(1.743)	(2.649)
Observations	155	155	152	152	152	152

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

⁴⁹ Serious Fraud (Concerns of Fraud for Pre-Election time frame), and Time Since Civil War used to predict zeroes