

Appendix for “Words and Deeds: From Incompatibilities to Outcomes in Anti-Government Disputes”

Procedures to identify claims

To identify incompatibilities over government, we focus on the articulation of maximalist claims by *organizations* that exist outside the government that may not reach large-scale mobilization, but entail more than isolated dissidents. Building on the UCDP/PRIO definition, a maximalist claim over government can either relate to electoral legitimacy, government composition, or regime change.

- 1) **Electoral legitimacy** claims pertain to the conduct of or circumstances under which elections or referenda took place—e.g., claims of electoral fraud;
- 2) **Government composition** claims call for the removal of high-ranking government officials such as the state leader or cabinet-level ministers—outside of regular, institutional processes, such as elections or no confidence motions;
- 3) **Regime change** claims call for fundamental changes to the political system, such as establishing democracy or theocracy or otherwise dramatically changing the political institutions of the country—e.g., moving from an appointed to an elected legislature.

This definition of maximalist claims excludes claims limited to policy, such as protest over environmental regulation or austerity measures, which typically do not challenge the overall political system *per se*.

We identified claims by searching in news sources and secondary literature¹ for instances of maximalist claims over government made in either: a) written or verbal statements by the leadership

¹ The primary sources were English-language news sources extracted from Lexis Nexis, Factiva, and ProQuest. Secondary sources consulted include Keesings, Freedom House country reports, the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia,

or official outlet of a non-state organization in the course of speeches, interviews, or press-releases; b) nonviolent public events by such organizations—e.g., protests, sit-ins, or boycotts—in which maximalist claims were made by members of the organization in the course of the event (i.e., in chanting, placards, manifestos, and not just in individual "man-on-the-street interviews" by media), or c) violent activity, such as a bombing or guerilla attack, that is attributed (by sources other than the government) to an organization that has previously articulated a maximalist claim and not renounced it.²

Claims had to be made by an organization that exists in some form outside the government, but which may also participate in the government as part of the regular political process. An "organization" can be either a) an explicitly named insurgency or political party—e.g., *Pora!* in Ukraine or *The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat* in Algeria; b) a more generally identified non-state group participating in opposition politics—e.g., "opposition parties," "Leftist militants," or c) broader societal groups, such as "university students," or "the dockworkers' union" that may make maximalist claims and can be assumed to have an inherent degree of organization. Groups that were explicitly noted in the sources consulted as having fewer than 25 members were not considered as organizations. With this understanding of organizations and maximalist claims, we code a yearly binary indicator of the presence or absence of any extra-governmental organization articulating a governmental incompatibility.

Minorities at Risk (MAR) group Chronologies, the DADM Intra-State Dispute Narratives, BBC Country Profile, the African Elections Database, the Global Nonviolent Action Database, and NAVCO campaign narratives.

² Violent actions without attribution or by an organization with no identified maximalist claim were not counted in the coding. Reports of a clandestine opposition were also not considered, as a key criterion in the GIDP coding was the public articulation of the claim.

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for claims stage*

Variable	Observations	Mean	Min	Max	Standard Deviation
Autocracy	4355	0.520	0	1	0.500
Anocracy	4355	0.142	0	1	0.349
Log GDPPC	4404	7.426	4.414	11.674	1.345
Log Urban Population	4259	7.880	2.611	13.415	1.906
Log Rural Population	4259	8.241	2.609	13.657	1.902
INGOs	3618	77.730	0	698	81.254
Territorial civil war	4402	0.076	0	1	0.266
Neighboring civil war over government	4402	0.522	0	1	0.499
Neighboring non-violent campaign	3891	0.213	0	1	0.410

*The descriptive statistics for the claims models are for all country-years in our sample.

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for mobilization stage*

Variable	Observations	Mean	Min	Max	Standard Deviation
Autocracy	2292	0.470	0	1	0.499
Anocracy	2292	0.220	0	1	0.415
Log GDPPC	2281	7.342	4.569	10.325	1.200
Log Urban Population	2210	8.322	3.996	13.317	1.689
Log Rural Population	2210	8.784	3.525	13.657	1.736
INGOs	1783	87.892	0	454	71.699
Territorial civil war	2280	0.119	0	1	0.324
Neighboring non-violent campaign	1968	0.248	0	1	0.432
Neighboring civil war	2280	0.640	0	1	0.480

*Descriptive statistics for the mobilization stage are only for those country-years in which claims were observed.

Table A.3: Countries included in random sample and number of years of incompatibilities, civil war, and non-violent campaigns.

Country	Incompatibility	Civil war	Non-violent campaign	Total
Afghanistan	35	33	0	53
Angola	38	26	0	38
Argentina	23	4	8	53
Armenia	21	0	0	21
Azerbaijan	21	2	0	22
Bahrain	25	0	0	42
Bangladesh	42	0	4	42
Benin	12	0	2	53
Bhutan	15	0	0	53
Bosnia	11	0	0	21
Botswana	6	0	0	47
Brazil	31	0	2	53
Bulgaria	17	0	1	53
Burundi	25	17	0	51
Central African Republic	29	4	0	52
Chad	50	36	0	53
Chile	24	0	6	53
China	19	0	7	53
Comoros	11	0	0	38
Congo (Kinshasa)	41	14	0	53
Costa Rica	2	0	0	53
Croatia	4	0	2	22
Cuba	43	1	0	53
Cyprus	5	0	0	53
Czechoslovakia	18	0	3	33
Dominican Republic	32	0	0	53
Djibouti	27	5	0	36
East Germany	4	0	1	31
Egypt	39	6	6	53
Estonia	5	0	0	22
Ethiopia	45	16	0	53
Fiji	18	0	0	43
France	8	2	0	53
Gabon	27	0	0	53

Gambia	20	0	0	48
Georgia	19	3	1	22
Ghana	20	0	1	53
Guinea-Bissau	16	0	0	39
Hungary	19	0	1	53
India	44	24	0	53
Indonesia	41	2	3	53
Iran	43	21	2	53
Ivory Coast	21	4	0	53
Jordan	28	0	0	53
Kazakhstan	21	0	0	22
Kosovo	3	0	0	5
Kyrgyzstan	17	0	2	22
Laos	46	15	0	53
Latvia	0	0	0	22
Lesotho	31	1	0	47
Libya	25	1	0	53
Lithuania	4	0	0	22
Macedonia	12	1	0	22
Madagascar	28	1	4	53
Malaysia	38	4	0	50
Malawi	27	0	2	49
Maldives	9	0	4	48
Malta	3	0	0	49
Mauritania	14	2	0	53
Mexico	37	2	15	53
Mongolia	21	0	2	53
Mozambique	33	16	0	37
Myanmar (Burma)	53	33	3	53
Namibia	11	0	0	23
Nepal	49	14	2	53
Niger	27	5	2	53
North Korea	1	0	0	53
Oman	13	7	0	53
Pakistan	45	8	1	53
Panama	21	0	3	53
Papua New Guinea	10	0	0	38
Paraguay	23	0	0	53
Poland	13	0	13	53

Qatar	0	0	0	42
Romania	16	1	2	53
Russia (USSR)	22	1	0	53
Rwanda	27	15	0	51
Saudi Arabia	25	1	0	53
Senegal	22	0	1	53
Sierra Leone	28	10	0	52
Slovakia	8	0	0	19
Solomon Islands	4	0	0	35
South Korea	44	0	4	53
South Sudan	2	0	0	2
South Yemen	7	0	0	24
Sri Lanka	32	3	1	53
Syria	27	5	0	53
Sudan	42	31	1	53
Swaziland	20	0	0	45
Tajikistan	20	8	0	22
Taiwan	39	0	7	53
Tanzania	26	0	1	52
Thailand	46	9	4	53
Togo	29	1	0	53
Tunisia	27	1	0	53
Uganda	43	34	0	51
Ukraine	18	0	4	22
United Arab Emirates	2	0	0	42
Uruguay	21	1	2	53
Venezuela	41	1	0	53
Zambia	25	0	3	49
Total	1,477	299	92	3,112

Table A.4: Logit models of mobilization, given claims
(sample is country-years with claims)

	Non-violent campaign		Civil war	
	Onset	Incidence	Onset	Incidence
Autocracy (lag)	1.986*	2.610**	-0.209	0.532*
	(0.854)	(0.684)	(0.385)	(0.262)
Anocracy (lag)	1.101	1.859**	-0.120	0.489+
	(0.908)	(0.687)	(0.471)	(0.289)
GDP per capita (lag)	0.164	0.124	0.143	-0.067
	(0.239)	(0.189)	(0.234)	(0.165)
Urban pop (lag)	0.142	0.248	-0.266	-0.379**
	(0.227)	(0.204)	(0.217)	(0.130)
Rural pop (lag)	0.135	-0.139	0.362	0.341*
	(0.252)	(0.166)	(0.245)	(0.149)
INGO chapters (lag)	0.008*	0.013**	-0.006+	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Territorial civil war (lag)	-1.511+	-0.711	0.489	0.471+
	(0.860)	(0.639)	(0.572)	(0.264)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.743*	0.530+		
	(0.303)	(0.281)		
Neighboring civil war over government (lag)			0.176	0.597**
			(0.272)	(0.207)
Constant	-10.284**	-5.565**	-4.182*	0.168
	(2.666)	(1.651)	(2.033)	(1.523)
Observations	1,625	1,719	1,291	1,723

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.5: Claims and mobilization models with leader tenure control

	Claims incidence	Claims onset
Autocracy (lag)	0.293* (0.145)	-0.030 (0.216)
Anocracy (lag)	0.877** (0.189)	0.603* (0.254)
GDP per capita (lag)	0.080 (0.082)	-0.001 (0.088)
Urban pop (lag)	0.027 (0.084)	-0.025 (0.094)
Rural pop (lag)	0.155 (0.101)	0.121 (0.093)
INGO chapters (lag)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	0.617* (0.304)	0.664* (0.267)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.345* (0.135)	0.534** (0.154)
Leader tenure	0.006 (0.007)	0.024* (0.009)
Constant	-1.179 (0.916)	-2.895** (0.781)
Observations	3,353	1,666

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.5: Claims and mobilization models with leader tenure control (continued)

	Non-violent campaign				Civil war			
	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims
Autocracy (lag)	0.695*	0.092	1.123**	0.126	-0.081	0.064	0.208	0.169*
	(0.323)	(0.085)	(0.333)	(0.084)	(0.169)	(0.089)	(0.149)	(0.085)
Anocracy (lag)	0.371	0.478**	0.782*	0.492**	-0.068	0.394**	0.176	0.512**
	(0.352)	(0.110)	(0.345)	(0.109)	(0.226)	(0.117)	(0.166)	(0.110)
GDP per capita (lag)	0.079	0.039	0.076	0.045	0.031	0.031	-0.073	0.046
	(0.104)	(0.045)	(0.100)	(0.045)	(0.102)	(0.049)	(0.091)	(0.047)
Urban pop (lag)	0.055	0.011	0.126	0.012	-0.105	0.053	-0.171*	0.007
	(0.099)	(0.047)	(0.104)	(0.046)	(0.097)	(0.048)	(0.070)	(0.048)
Rural pop (lag)	0.084	0.087	-0.040	0.093	0.143	0.039	0.139+	0.097+
	(0.105)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.057)	(0.107)	(0.055)	(0.084)	(0.058)
INGO chapters (lag)	0.003*	-0.000	0.006**	-0.000	-0.002+	-0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	-0.630+	0.328+	-0.403	0.305+	0.193	0.268+	0.236	0.354*
	(0.340)	(0.172)	(0.327)	(0.172)	(0.262)	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.174)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.304*		0.294*			0.207**		0.203**
	(0.139)		(0.143)			(0.080)		(0.075)
Neighboring civil war over government (lag)		0.188*		0.172*	0.082		0.345**	
		(0.074)		(0.071)	(0.121)		(0.110)	
Leader tenure	0.012	0.004	0.009	0.004	-0.008	0.007	-0.008	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Constant	-5.047**	-0.602	-3.142**	-0.692	-1.797+	-0.445	0.614	-0.657
	(1.113)	(0.532)	(0.871)	(0.520)	(0.980)	(0.494)	(0.876)	(0.525)
Rho		0.099		0.036		-0.193		-0.166
		(0.165)		(0.181)		(0.191)		(0.148)
Observations	3,265	3,265	3,373	3,373	2,852	2,852	3,353	3,353

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed); Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.6: Analysis restricted to civil wars with 1,000 battle-deaths per year threshold

	Civil war (1000 bd)		Civil war (1000 bd)	
	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims
Autocracy (lag)	0.617*	0.131	0.605**	0.194*
	(0.302)	(0.081)	(0.198)	(0.082)
Anocracy (lag)	0.457	0.467**	0.522+	0.526**
	(0.315)	(0.112)	(0.293)	(0.108)
GDP per capita (lag)	-0.084	0.027	-0.051	0.045
	(0.115)	(0.046)	(0.140)	(0.047)
Urban pop (lag)	-0.351**	0.034	-0.199*	0.010
	(0.115)	(0.048)	(0.089)	(0.049)
Rural pop (lag)	0.239+	0.059	0.252*	0.093
	(0.127)	(0.057)	(0.121)	(0.059)
INGO chapters (lag)	0.004*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	0.136	0.332*	-0.056	0.357*
	(0.235)	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.174)
Neighboring civil war over government (lag)	0.236		0.519**	
	(0.235)		(0.177)	
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)		0.218**		0.207**
		(0.079)		(0.075)
Constant	-0.872	-0.389	-1.016	-0.631
	(1.175)	(0.502)	(1.225)	(0.527)
Rho		-0.341		-0.273
		(0.287)		(0.245)
Observations	3,086	3,086	3,353	3,353

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.7: Adding history of other mobilization

	Non-violent campaign				Civil war			
	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims
Autocracy (lag)	0.730*	0.072	1.164**	0.154+	-0.235	0.100	0.110	0.194*
	(0.331)	(0.084)	(0.326)	(0.080)	(0.178)	(0.084)	(0.142)	(0.082)
Anocracy (lag)	0.469	0.390**	0.808*	0.510**	-0.234	0.413**	0.070	0.528**
	(0.353)	(0.108)	(0.342)	(0.107)	(0.234)	(0.118)	(0.171)	(0.108)
GDP per capita (lag)	0.116	0.040	0.063	0.045	-0.032	0.025	-0.100	0.045
	(0.111)	(0.046)	(0.103)	(0.045)	(0.109)	(0.050)	(0.090)	(0.047)
Urban pop (lag)	-0.034	0.049	0.132	0.016	-0.087	0.057	-0.147*	0.011
	(0.108)	(0.048)	(0.103)	(0.046)	(0.103)	(0.050)	(0.073)	(0.049)
Rural pop (lag)	0.185	0.046	-0.046	0.088	0.146	0.028	0.168+	0.092
	(0.115)	(0.057)	(0.092)	(0.057)	(0.118)	(0.058)	(0.089)	(0.059)
INGO chapters (lag)	0.003	-0.000	0.005**	-0.000	-0.003*	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	-0.817+	0.271+	-0.372	0.308+	0.217	0.288+	0.188	0.357*
	(0.459)	(0.150)	(0.325)	(0.173)	(0.286)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.175)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.278+		0.296*			0.221**		0.209**
	(0.142)		(0.146)			(0.082)		(0.075)
Neighboring civil war over government (lag)		0.151*		0.175*	0.063		0.268*	
		(0.075)		(0.071)	(0.122)		(0.124)	
Time since other mobilization	0.012		0.006		0.007		0.011*	
	(0.008)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Constant	-5.555**	-0.581	-3.091**	-0.669	-1.542	-0.342	0.289	-0.633
	(1.200)	(0.503)	(0.891)	(0.522)	(1.044)	(0.505)	(0.921)	(0.526)
Rho		0.072		0.032		-0.176		-0.162
		(0.176)		(0.178)		(0.193)		(0.151)
Observations	2,974	2,974	3,373	3,373	2,805	2,805	3,353	3,353

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.8: Claims models with military capacity control

	Claims incidence	Claims onset
Autocracy (lag)	0.241+ (0.144)	0.188 (0.207)
Anocracy (lag)	0.964** (0.204)	0.759** (0.278)
Urban pop (lag)	-0.056 (0.094)	0.147 (0.103)
Rural pop (lag)	0.128+ (0.071)	0.061 (0.080)
INGO chapters (lag)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	0.589+ (0.312)	0.696* (0.277)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.350* (0.138)	0.571** (0.158)
Military capacity (lag)	0.178 (0.109)	-0.291* (0.125)
Constant	0.386 (0.533)	-3.913** (0.663)
Observations	3,109	1,502

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.9: Mobilization models with military capacity control

	Non-violent campaign				Civil war			
	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims
Autocracy (lag)	0.875*	0.072	1.242**	0.105	-0.205	0.111	0.105	0.141+
	(0.355)	(0.084)	(0.335)	(0.082)	(0.170)	(0.088)	(0.145)	(0.085)
Anocracy (lag)	0.528	0.517**	0.877*	0.538**	-0.110	0.477**	0.125	0.559**
	(0.376)	(0.114)	(0.351)	(0.114)	(0.233)	(0.124)	(0.179)	(0.117)
Urban pop (lag)	0.147+	-0.042	0.181+	-0.043	-0.211+	0.082	-0.362**	-0.040
	(0.087)	(0.054)	(0.096)	(0.052)	(0.114)	(0.057)	(0.092)	(0.053)
Rural pop (lag)	0.005	0.077+	-0.101	0.081*	0.161+	0.009	0.231**	0.082*
	(0.072)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.041)	(0.086)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.041)
INGO chapters	0.003*	-0.000	0.006**	0.000	-0.003*	-0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	-0.584+	0.314+	-0.374	0.289+	0.189	0.277+	0.242	0.337+
	(0.341)	(0.175)	(0.318)	(0.175)	(0.264)	(0.155)	(0.171)	(0.177)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.370**		0.341*			0.232**		0.204**
	(0.134)		(0.136)			(0.079)		(0.077)
Neighboring civil war (lag)		0.180*		0.166*	0.064		0.316**	
		(0.078)		(0.075)	(0.125)		(0.115)	
Military capacity (lag)	-0.039	0.092	0.003	0.102+	0.213	-0.028	0.261+	0.098
	(0.146)	(0.059)	(0.150)	(0.060)	(0.152)	(0.069)	(0.146)	(0.061)
Constant	-4.699**	0.249	-2.580**	0.231	-0.760	-0.209	0.947+	0.228
	(0.865)	(0.311)	(0.637)	(0.309)	(0.701)	(0.335)	(0.557)	(0.312)
Rho		0.134		0.058		-0.180		-0.126
		(0.169)		(0.186)		(0.187)		(0.149)
Observations	3,002	3,002	3,109	3,109	2,657	2,657	3,109	3,109

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.10: Claims models with state reach control

	Claims incidence	Claims onset
Autocracy (lag)	0.493** (0.147)	0.415* (0.212)
Anocracy (lag)	0.980** (0.196)	0.751** (0.261)
State reach (lag)	0.232 (0.247)	0.137 (0.235)
INGO chapters (lag)	0.002+ (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	0.910** (0.288)	0.806** (0.284)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.407** (0.146)	0.728** (0.141)
Constant	0.385 (0.289)	-2.486** (0.325)
Observations	2,994	1,428

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1(two-tailed)
 Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

Table A.11: Mobilization models with state reach control

	Non-violent campaign				Civil war			
	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims
Autocracy (lag)	0.985** (0.375)	0.210* (0.087)	1.311** (0.328)	0.242** (0.086)	-0.092 (0.166)	0.190* (0.088)	0.173 (0.153)	0.294** (0.087)
Anocracy (lag)	0.442 (0.400)	0.557** (0.114)	0.860* (0.339)	0.567** (0.114)	-0.102 (0.241)	0.511** (0.127)	0.162 (0.187)	0.585** (0.116)
State reach (lag)	0.655* (0.270)	0.078 (0.139)	0.454+ (0.270)	0.112 (0.138)	-0.085 (0.255)	0.088 (0.132)	-0.127 (0.228)	0.124 (0.141)
INGO chapters (lag)	0.005** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.007** (0.002)	0.001+ (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001+ (0.001)
Territorial civil war (lag)	-0.480 (0.305)	0.503** (0.159)	-0.388 (0.307)	0.487** (0.161)	0.298 (0.240)	0.415** (0.151)	0.254 (0.176)	0.534** (0.165)
Neighboring non-violent campaign (lag)	0.287* (0.144)		0.259+ (0.143)			0.228** (0.086)		0.240** (0.081)
Neighboring civil war (lag)		0.173* (0.070)		0.162* (0.069)	0.090 (0.124)		0.348** (0.112)	
Constant	- 4.509** (0.711)	0.261+ (0.157)	-2.602** (0.540)	0.230 (0.155)	- 1.104** (0.344)	0.272+ (0.161)	0.256 (0.325)	0.232 (0.166)
Rho		0.108 (0.181)		0.098 (0.187)		-0.209 (0.200)		-0.176 (0.159)
Observations	2,910	2,910	3,003	3,003	2,528	2,528	2,994	2,994

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not show

Table A.12: Censored probit models with neighbor of neighbor measures

	Non-violent campaign				Civil war			
	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims	Onset	Claims	Incidence	Claims
Autocracy	0.767*	0.117	1.175**	0.147+	-0.134	0.102	0.179	0.148+
	(0.319)	(0.081)	(0.324)	(0.079)	(0.167)	(0.083)	(0.147)	(0.081)
Anocracy	0.413	0.556**	0.803*	0.578**	-0.192	0.464**	0.103	0.584**
	(0.353)	(0.117)	(0.344)	(0.117)	(0.225)	(0.124)	(0.172)	(0.116)
GDP per capita	0.075	0.035	0.080	0.044	0.063	0.023	-0.053	0.047
	(0.102)	(0.046)	(0.097)	(0.045)	(0.104)	(0.048)	(0.092)	(0.046)
Urban pop	0.066	0.007	0.120	0.006	-0.130	0.049	-0.199**	-0.013
	(0.094)	(0.049)	(0.101)	(0.048)	(0.099)	(0.047)	(0.074)	(0.048)
Rural pop	0.067	0.089	-0.042	0.098+	0.159	0.041	0.152+	0.108+
	(0.098)	(0.057)	(0.090)	(0.056)	(0.110)	(0.056)	(0.087)	(0.058)
INGO chapters	0.003*	-0.000	0.006**	-0.000	-	-0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	0.003+	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Territorial civil war	-0.622+	0.356*	-0.400	0.328+	0.191	0.252	0.238	0.340+
	(0.343)	(0.173)	(0.318)	(0.173)	(0.261)	(0.154)	(0.151)	(0.174)
Neighboring nonviolent campaign	0.332*		0.314*					
	(0.135)		(0.139)					
Neighbors' neighbor civil war ³		0.252**		0.250**				
		(0.083)		(0.080)				
Neighboring civil war over government					0.072		0.308**	
					(0.120)		(0.114)	
Neighbors' neighbor NV campaign						0.180*		0.181*
						(0.071)		(0.076)
Constant	-	-0.632	-3.069**	-0.751	-	-0.392	0.668	-0.583
	4.922**				1.872+			
	(1.112)	(0.533)	(0.878)	(0.526)	(1.002)	(0.501)	(0.891)	(0.536)
Rho		0.070		0.011		-0.261		-0.205
		(0.172)		(0.186)		(0.182)		(0.137)
Observations	3,147	3,147	3,254	3,254	2,801	2,801	3,258	3,258

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 Cubic polynomial estimates of risk-time not shown

³ "Neighbors' neighbor civil war" and "Neighbors' neighbor NV campaign" are indicators which capture whether a neighbor of the country's neighbor saw civil war over government or a non-violent campaign, respectively. This indicator was coded as 0 if the neighbors' neighbor was also a neighbor of the country in question—e.g., Romania was not considered a neighbors' neighbor of Hungary, even though it is a neighbor of Ukraine—a neighbor of Hungary—because it is also a neighbor of Hungary itself.